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 Abstract                                                                                                
Minimum wages have been in place for South Africa’s one million domestic service workers
since November of 2002. Using data from seven waves of the Labour Force Survey, this
paper documents that the real hourly wages, average monthly earnings, and total earnings of
all employed domestic workers have risen since the regulations came into effect, while hours
of work per week and employment have fallen. Each of these outcomes can be linked
econometrically to the arrival of the minimum wage regulations. The overall estimated
elasticities suggest that the regulations should have reduced poverty somewhat for domestic
workers, although this last conclusion is the least robust.
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 1.  Introduction                                                                                                     
In September of 2002, South Africa’s 1.2 million domestic workers – about one million mostly
African and Coloured women who work as housekeepers, cooks and nannies, and another
200,000 men, mostly gardeners – were granted new labour market protections, including the
right to a written contract with their employers and the rights to paid leave, severance pay, and 
notice prior to dismissal (Department of Labour, 2002a). In November of 2002, a schedule of
minimum wages including time-and-a-half provisions for overtime work went into effect. The
minima were set above the median hourly wages that prevailed at the time, and so constitute
a major intervention in South Africa’s lowest-wage labour market. (The minima were
increased in November of 2003 and again in November of 2004.) As of May 2003, employers
were also required to register any domestic workers whom they employed for more than 24
hours a month with the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) and to withhold UIF
contributions from their paychecks. At that point employed and contributing domestic workers 
began to earn credits towards future potential UIF benefits, at a rate one day’s benefit for
every six days worked.
This paper attempts to determine what collective effect these regulations have had on wages, 
employment levels, hours of work, total earnings, and the conditions of employment of
domestic workers, using data from the semi-annual Labour Force Surveys (LFS) of
September 2001 through September 2004. After describing the survey data and some of its
strengths and weaknesses, I present the results of a simple before-and-after comparison,
with no adjustment for other factors that might have affected the market for domestic
services. I then present some econometric evidence on the question of whether and to what
extent the observed outcomes are in fact causally related to the introduction of the
regulations.
I find that the average real hourly wages of domestic workers have indeed risen since the
regulations went into effect, by almost 20 per cent: from R3.74 (in September 2001 / February 
2002) to R4.45 (in mid-2004, all at September 2004 prices).1 This reflects a 22 per cent
increase in women’s wages, and an increase for men of either 6.6 or 12 per cent, depending
on the sample definition, as will be explained below. Over this same period, the percentage of
workers estimated to be earning less than the applicable hourly minimum fell from 75 per cent
to 63 per cent.
These wage increases have been accompanied by a 5 per cent reduction in average hours
worked per week for women; for men the decrease was roughly 2 per cent, and was not
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.2  Employment of full and part-time women (not
 1  
1 The rand was worth US$0.153 in September 2004, meaning the average hourly wage rose from $0.57 to $0.68.
2 Unless otherwise stated, the 10 per cent threshold is assumed.
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adjusted for fulltime equivalency) also fell, by 10 or 12 per cent. Strikingly, male employment
rose by 14 or 15 per cent.
The combined effect of the changes in wages and hours was that the average real monthly
earnings of employed domestic workers increased by about 15 per cent (9 per cent for men,
and 16 per cent for women). For men, who benefited from the employment increase, total
estimated earnings also rose, by about 27 per cent. For women, however, the employment
losses offset some of the wage gains, resulting in an estimated net increase in total earnings
of 3.5 to 5 per cent, figures that are not statistically different from zero. For men and women
combined, total earnings rose significantly, by 8 or 9 per cent.
The results for the non-wage outcomes include a rapid increase in the number of workers
reporting that they have a written contract with their employer, and that UIF contributions are
being withheld, although the rate of compliance with these two provisions would still appear to
be less than 30 per cent. The changing nature of the employment relationship may also be
gauged by the number of cases brought before the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation,
and Arbitration (CCMA), which has increased by roughly 50 per cent since the regulations
went into effect.
The econometric results are based on a cross-regional analysis of before/after changes in
wages, hours, and jobs, and they generally support the proposition that the introduction of
minimum wages caused average wages to rise, and hours of work and total employment to
fall. For women, the minimum wage appeared to have no effect on employment in Year 1, but
a significant negative effect in Year 2. For men, whose employment rose over time, there is
nonetheless a detectable negative effect of the minimum wage, which also appeared to have
been stronger in the second year than the first.
The combination of higher total real earnings but fewer people employed means that poverty
and ultrapoverty could have risen or fallen, depending on where the winners and losers are
located in the income distribution. Although the LFS data are not adequate for a full poverty
analysis, I can compare the estimated elasticities of employment derived here to some critical
values I estimated from earlier research, using the 1993 PSLSD data (Hertz 2002). This
comparison suggests that the cumulative two-year changes in wages and employment
brought about by the new regulations should, on balance, have reduced poverty somewhat,
particularly for the households of male domestic workers, although this conclusion is
necessarily tentative.
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  2.  Data Issues
Waves 4 and 5 of the Labour Force Survey were undertaken in September of 2001 and
February of 2002, before the domestic worker regulations were promulgated (in September
of 2002). In the analyses that follow, these two waves are pooled and designated Year 0. I will
present evidence that employers do not appear to have acted in anticipation of the
regulations (which had been discussed in the media for some time), so that data from this
period constitute a legitimate baseline. The next wave, from September of 2002, coincides
with the introduction of the non-wage obligations, but predates the minimum wages, which
only came into effect in November. This wave is omitted from the before/after comparisons,
being neither before nor after. Waves 7 and 8, from March and September of 2003 are pooled
and treated as Year 1 of the minimum wage regime.3  Waves 9 and 10, from March and
September of 2004, are pooled and designated Year 2; note that higher minima were in effect
for this period. In addition to reducing sampling variability, pooling the waves in pairs
eliminates any seasonal effects (e.g. for gardeners) by combining a fall and spring survey for
each year.
  2.1   Survey Design
Each survey covers roughly 30,000 households and together Waves 4 through 9 constitute a
rotating panel, with an intended replacement rate of 20 per cent per wave.4  The initial sample
consisted of 10 households from each of 3000 clusters, which were drawn from the 1996
census master list of enumerator areas; these were stratified into 18 layers, representing the
urban and rural areas of each of the nine provinces. In calculating the standard errors of the
descriptive means and totals it is important to allow for contemporaneously correlated
outcomes among individuals in the same cluster, as well as between individuals in a given
cluster from one wave to the next. The sequential correlation derives both from the fact that
80 per cent of the households from one wave were supposed to be re-interviewed in the next,
and from the fact that the remaining 20 per cent of households were drawn from the same
clusters as the households they were replacing.5
 3 
3 Domestic workers on farms initially were exempt, but subsequently were covered by an identical set of provisions
in a separate sectoral determination, with an effective date of 1 March 2003, meaning that they too were entitled to
minimum wages for the first time in the March 2003 survey (Dept. of Labour 2002b). Note also that the UIF
registration requirement, which some have held to be more burdensome than the wage provisions, became
effective on 30 April 2003, so its impact should first be noticed in the second half of Year 1.
4 Personal and family IDs are not invariant across waves, making it difficult to match people over time. As a result,
the actual share of people who are the same from one wave to the next is not known with precision, but it appears
to be substantially less than the 80% target. To the best of my knowledge, these ID problems have prevented any
researchers from exploiting the panel nature of the dataset, myself included.
5 As with the US Current Population Survey, it is dwellings that are revisited, not families. Families that move are not
followed, but are instead replaced by the family that now occupies their former dwelling. Ashenfelter, Deaton and
Solon (1986) note that families that occupy the same dwelling at different times are likely to be similar, so it is
plausible that not much precision in measured changes over time is sacrificed by the failure to track down and
reinterview the original family.
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For the September 2004 survey (Wave 10), a new master sample was selected. The 3000
new clusters were drawn from the 2001 census list of enumerator areas, and were stratified
by the 53 newly demarcated district councils that make up South Africa. This last wave is
treated as independent of the first six. All told, for the pooled analysis of Years 0, 1, and 2,
there are 18+53=71 independent strata and 5984 clusters; half the clusters span waves 4
through 9, and the other half are unique to wave 10. Standard errors calculated under this
design are larger than if clustering and stratification are ignored, although the size of the
design effect varies considerably with the quantity being estimated. The standard error of
total employment in Year 1, for example, rises by 70 per cent; however, the standard error of
the change in employment from Year 0 to Year 1 is only 8 per cent larger than if the effects of
clustering and stratification are ignored. For mean hourly wages, the increase in standard
errors is much smaller, on the order of 13 per cent for levels, and just 1 per cent for changes.6
  2.2   Weights
The sampling weights distributed with the 2001 and 2002 rounds of the LFS were based on
the 1996 census, and yield a significantly different demographic distribution than that of the
more nearly contemporaneous 2001 census. This inconsistency is troublesome, as the
estimated domestic worker employment totals are quite sensitive to the demographic
weights. The 2001 census, however, is believed to have misrepresented some key
demographic proportions, including the proportion of the population who are women of
working age, an obvious correlate of domestic worker status.7 Furthermore, the population
growth rate used to extrapolate from 1996 to later years turned out to be almost twice as large 
as the actual growth rate, due to an initial failure to account for the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Beginning with the March 2003 survey, the weights were recalculated to mirror the
demographic distribution of the 2001 census, and then adjusted for estimated demographic
changes between 2001 and 2003, including internal migration (Statistics South Africa 2003).
The erroneous population growth rate assumptions, and the problems with the census
proportions, were not corrected until the September 2004 survey (Wave 10), when improved
mortality data became available (Statistics South Africa 2004, 2005). This resulted in a
significant downward revision of the estimated size of the population, and hence of the level
of employment. Statistics South Africa ( StatsSA) has also published revised estimates of key
labour market statistics for March 2004, and is working on a full set of revised weights for the
 4  
6 Although stratification and clustering are acknowledged in the calculation of standard errors, not all of the benefits
of the rotating panel design are exploited. Ashenfelter, Deaton and Solon (1986) observe that the most efficient
estimator of the mean of a variable in a given period (as well its change over time) is derived from data from both
periods. The formula requires that we know the proportion of people that are retained from one survey to the next,
as well as the population correlation of the variable in question between the two periods. The difficulties in
matching IDs across waves, noted above, have so far prevented me from estimating these parameters, and from
pursuing this approach.
7 Personal communication with analysts at Statistics South Africa. The census reports that 52.2 per cent of the
populationare female, while the September 2004 LFS reports 50.7 per cent.
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earlier waves that will reflect the new mortality information. For the time being, however, no
consistent official series of sampling weights is available. This poses a serious problem, as
both the changes in scale and the changes in the age, gender, province, and race-group
distributions result in artifactual changes in the measured employment of domestic workers
that are too large to be ignored.
To address this problem, I treated the most recent weights (those from Wave 10, which
incorporate the updated HIV/AIDS mortality effects, and are believed to fix the problems with
the census as well) as correct, and recalibrated the weights for Waves 4 through 9 to yield the
same age, sex, race, province, and urban/rural distribution. I then applied StatsSA’s most
recent published estimates of annual population growth from 2001 to 2004 to adjust the total
population size of the earlier surveys (Statistics South Africa 2004).8 This resolves some of
the worst inconsistencies in the weights, but at the price of introducing an artificial stability in
the demographic distribution. Presuming the Wave 10 weights are in fact correct for
September 2004, they are almost certainly incorrect for September 2001, and this could bias
the descriptive and econometric results in various ways. However, if this bias is not too severe 
(i.e. if the net change in the demographic proportions over three years has not been too
great), it may be offset by the increase in precision that results from eliminating one
component of sampling variability, namely, the fact that the sample’s weighted distribution
could vary over time, even if the population’s demographic distribution were stable.
The results of these corrections are illustrated in Figure 1, which also introduces the question
of sample definition. The bottom lines (solid and hollow circles) compare the originally
published estimates of the number of domestic workers for March 2004 with StatsSA’s
revised estimates for that month. The difference is 166,000 people, or 20 per cent of the
revised total, demonstrating that the estimated number of domestic workers is quite sensitive
to the choice of weights. The next line up (asterisks) implements the same definition of who is
a domestic worker as is used by StatsSA, but applies my own modified weights. These figures 
coincide with the published estimates for September 2004, by construction, but are larger by
about 50,000 in Year 0, and smaller by about the same amount in Year 1, for a net reduction of 
100,000 workers (about 10 per cent of the total) when calculating the change from Year 0 to
Year 1. The revised official estimates produce only a very slightly downward sloping trend in
domestic worker employment over three years, but the recalibrated weights result in much
larger estimated employment losses, which will be discussed below.
 5 
8 The figure they report is a 5.77 per cent growth rate from 2000 to 2005, which would imply 3.43 per cent over the
three study years, from September 2001 to September 2004. This estimate, however, is higher than those of the
HSRC and the ASSA, reflecting StatsSA’s lower mortality and HIV prevalence assumptions (Statistics South
Africa 2004, Table 8)
Figure 1: Domestic Worker Employment Levels using revised Population Weights, under Broad and
Narrow Sample Definitions, compared to Statistics South Africa’s published estimates                                      
2.3  Definition of domestic work
StatsSA’s definition of domestic work is based on a single occupation code, and a
corresponding, but independently ascertained, industry code. It does not capture all the
people who are covered by the new minimum wage regulations, with the principal omission
being gardeners (mostly men). Fortunately, the survey contains a host of questions that may
be used to identify covered workers. Respondents are first asked a series of yes/no
questions, designed to pick up all forms of labour force participation, of which one is: “In the
last seven days, did [name] do any work as a domestic worker for a wage, salary, or any
payment in kind?” Later, employed respondents are asked their occupations: About 83 per
cent of those who report having performed domestic work are coded as “domestic helpers
and cleaners” (code 9131, the basis of the StatsSA definition); the other relevant occupations
include gardeners (16 per cent, code 6113 in waves 4-6, but code 9211 in waves 7-10),
nannies (0.5 per cent, code 5131), and security guards (0.2 per cent, code 5169). Next, a pair
of questions is used to establish an industry code, of which domestic work is again one.
Another question categorizes the types of employers, and includes the option: “Working for
one or more private households as a domestic employee, gardener or security guard.”
Finally, there are questions about the location of the workplace, and about whether the
DPRU Working Paper 05/99 Tom Hertz
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workwas formal or informal, the latter category being stipulated to include domestic work.9
Note that the task is to identify those for whom domestic work is the main job, since the wage
and hours data relate to the main job only.
These questions may be combined in various ways to define the set of workers covered by
the new regulations, and the choice of definition matters for the measurement of employment
trends. Given this problem, I present results based on a narrow and a broad definition of
domestic employment. The narrow definition requires that all relevant questions be answered 
in a way that is consistent with domestic employment: in particular, the worker must (a) have
performed domestic work in the past seven days or report that they have a job from which
they are temporarily absent; (b) meet the StatsSA definition of employment, which allows for
recent absence from work for some reasons but not others; (c) report working in a private
household; (d) be categorised as working in the domestic industry; (e) report an occupation
code of either 9131, 6113, 9211, or 5131 (code 5169, security guards, is disallowed because
they are covered by a different sectoral determination); and (f) report a work location that is
neither a formal business, shop, market, nor street corner. This (narrow) definition yielded
between 2400 and 3100 cases per survey wave, and the corresponding population-weighted
employment levels appear in Figure 1.
The broad definition effectively changes "and” to “or” in the above list: workers must either (a)
report having done domestic work in the past seven days, and not report any nondomestic
wage or salary employment; or (b) report working in a private home; or (c) be categorised as
working in the domestic industry; or (d) be assigned occupation code 9131. In addition, as
with the narrow definition, they must meet the Statistics South Africa definition of
employment, not be coded as security guards, and report an appropriate business location.
By this definition, there were between 2500 and 3200 full or part-time domestic workers in
each wave of the survey, or between 1.09 and 1.24 million in population-weighted terms
(upper line, Figure 1; these data also appear in Table 6, discussed below). Notice that the
broad and narrow definitions differ by only about 34,000 in Year 0, but diverge noticeably
thereafter. Given that the narrow definition probably undercounts domestic workers (since it
disqualifies anyone who makes a mistake, or is miscoded, on any of the many relevant
questions) while the broad definition probably overcounts, and yet they start in roughly the
same place, it seems likely that the two definitions bracket the true employment trend.
    2.4 Variable Definitions 
The survey contains a detailed set of questions relating to labour force status, money
earnings, and the terms of employment. However, no data are available on payments in kind,
which can be of considerable importance to domestic workers. Given that the new regulations 
place lower limits on wages, and upper limits on the degree to which payments in kind may be
The Effect of Minimum Wages on the Employment and Earnings of South Africa's Domestic Service Workers
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9 Despite this stipulation, I worried that the formal/informal distinction might have been variously interpreted, and
chose not to use this question in defining the sample.
substituted for wages, we might expect a reshuffling of the compensation package to occur.
The inability to track this substitution is one limitation of this analysis.10    
Hourly wages were calculated by dividing reported regular monthly earnings in one’s main job 
by reported usual weekly hours of work, including overtime, multiplied by an assumed 4.35
weeks per month. Earnings data are sometimes available only as intervals (e.g. R501 to
R1000); where this is the case, linear regressions of wages against a host of demographic,
regional and occupational indicators were used to impute an earnings value, with the
constraint that it must lie within the stated interval. Earnings are imputed in this fashion for
roughly 8 per cent of domestic workers. Once these are included, hourly wages are available
for 98 per cent of the sample. All earnings figures were converted to September 2004 prices
using the urban CPI published by the South African Reserve Bank.
Minimum wages were set at four distinct levels, with higher hourly rates for part-time workers
(those regularly working 27 or fewer hours per week), and for those working in “Area A”
(defined by a list of 54 of South Africa’s 262 newly demarcated municipalities, reproduced in
the Appendix.)11 The first round of minimum wages applied to the period 1 November 2002
through 31 October 2003, covering waves 7 and 8 of the LFS. The sectoral determination
also set wages for a second round, from 1 November 2003 through 31 October 2004, which
spans waves 9 and 10; these wage levels are about 8 per cent higher than the first year’s. 
Using these rules, a minimum hourly wage was assigned to each employed domestic worker
in each wave of the LFS survey, taking account of the reported usual hours of work, and
including the entitlement to overtime pay, at time-and-a-half rates, for up to 35 per cent of the
sample who report working more than 45 hours per week. Note that all domestic workers,
including those above the minimum, were entitled to an 8 per cent wage increase on that
date, and again in November of 2004. 
The determination of whether workers were entitled to the higher Area A wage was limited in
its precision by the lack of data on their employer’s location. However, the worker’s residential 
location was known, at least to the level of the magisterial district, 354 of which comprise the
whole of South Africa. It was assumed that Area A wages applied if any portion of the
magisterial district in which the worker resided was contained in any of the listed
municipalities.12 Municipalities and metro areas are defined fairly broadly, so nearby
DPRU Working Paper 05/99 Tom Hertz
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10 A second weakness of the survey is that the household’s non-labour income is not measured, and neither is
consumption, so neither income- nor consumption-based estimates of poverty are possible, limiting our
understanding of the distributional impact of employment and wage changes.
11 The 262 municipalities cover the full territory of South Africa: they include the six largest cities (metros), 231
smaller cities and towns, and 25 deep rural district management areas that are extremely sparsely populated.
12 This was accomplished using the master file that provides geographic attributes for all enumerator areas
associated with the 2001 Census (ea_sa.dbf), including the magisterial district codes that allow one to link back to
the 1996 census and to waves 4 through 9 of the LFS. Note that in wave 10, the actual municipality (of residence)
settlements are included: for example, workers living in Soweto, who likely work in
Johannesburg, are coded as belonging in Area A, as are those living in Khayelitsha and
working in Cape Town. Moreover, because of the imperfect overlap between magisterial
districts and municipalities, an additional portion who do not live within the municipal
boundaries, but who live in an overlapping magisterial district, are also coded as being
entitled to Area A wages. This errs of the side of assuming that these workers are employed in 
nearby towns, rather than in their more rural residential areas, which seems appropriate.
Workers living in still more remote areas and commuting longer distances to their urban
employers may be incorrectly coded as not being entitled to Area A wages. 
For the geographic analysis, each worker was assigned a magisterial district, as well as one
of the 262 new municipality codes, which can in turn be aggregated into the 53 district
councils.
3.   Basic Findings
Table 1 reports average real hourly wages for each wave, and their combined averages for
Years 0, 1, and 2; all percentage changes and significance tests are in relation to Year 0. We
see large and significant wage increases for women under either sample definition,
amounting to more than 20 per cent over two years. Increases for men are smaller (7or 12 per 
cent).13 The addendum to the table reports the percentage changes in nominal wages, which
total more than 35 per cent over two years for men and women combined. Table 2 reports the
proportion earning less than the applicable hourly minimum, with time-and-a-half for overtime 
factored in; this share falls significantly for both men and women under either sample
definition. We see that in March 2004, when the higher, second year minima had been in
effect for just four full months, the proportion earning less than the minimum temporarily rose,
before falling to its lowest level to date; this is consistent with a delayed response on the part
of employers. Together, these results suggest that the minimum wage is having the expected
effect on the bottom of the wage distribution, and that this effect is large enough to raise both
the nominal and real average wage. Still, it bears emphasising that, by these estimates, as of
September of 2004 about 58 per cent of employed domestic workers were still earning less
than the regulations require.14
The Effect of Minimum Wages on the Employment and Earnings of South Africa's Domestic Service Workers
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is known. However, for consistency with the earlier waves, the determination of Area A eligibility was made by the
same algorithm, relying on magisterial districts.
13 Note that the men’s Year 1 estimates are not statistically significantly higher than their Year 0 figures, and the
same is true for Year 2 under the broad definition.
14 It is possible that reported hours of work overstate actual hours of work, and certain that the assumption of 4.35
weeks of work per month is incorrect in many cases. Since this is the maximum possible, this assumption biases
the hourly wage downwards.
Table 1: Average Real Hourly Wages (Rand, at Sept. 2004 Prices)
DPRU Working Paper 05/99 Tom Hertz
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  Narrow Definition Broad Definition 
Survey Date Period Men Women All Men Women All 
Sept. 2001 Year 0 4.05 3.80 3.84 4.44 3.81 3.90 
Feb. 2002 Year 0 3.79 3.54 3.58 3.82 3.54 3.59 
Sept. 2002 (Omit) 3.74 3.43 3.49 3.67 3.44 3.48 
Mar. 2003 Year 1 3.91 3.80 3.83 3.95 3.79 3.83 
Sept. 2003 Year 1 4.30 3.95 4.01 4.23 4.07 4.10 
Mar. 2004 Year 2 4.09 4.18 4.17 4.11 4.18 4.16 
Sept. 2004 Year 2 4.65 4.77 4.74 4.59 4.81 4.76 
Year 0 3.90 3.67 3.70 4.09 3.67 3.74 
Year 1 4.09 3.88 3.92 4.07 3.93 3.96 
Averages 
(weighted 
 by employment) 
Year 2 4.38 4.46 4.44 4.36 4.47 4.45 
Year 1 4.9% 5.7% 5.9% -0.5% 7.1% 5.9% Pcnt. change 
from Year 0 Year 2 12.3% 21.5% 20.0% 6.6% 21.8% 19.0% 
Year 1 0.375 0.027 0.015 0.938 0.008 0.016 Significance 
of changes 
(p-value) Year 2 0.026   0.000 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.000 
Addendum: Change in Average Nominal Hourly Wages      
Year 1 18.5% 19.7% 19.5% 12.3% 20.9% 19.6% Pcnt. change 
from Year 0 Year 2 28.2% 39.2% 36.8% 21.6% 39.1% 35.9% 
Year 1 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000 Significance 
of changes 
(p-value) Year 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The Effect of Minimum Wages on the Employment and Earnings of South Africa's Domestic Service Workers
Table 2: Proportion Earning Less than the Applicable Minimum Hourly Wage
Figure 2 displays the estimated densities of real log hourly wages for men and women, using
the broad definition. The dotted lines represent the Year 0 distributions; the dashes are Year 1;
and the solid lines are Year 2. The distributions have clearly been shifting to the right, and they
display increasingly prominent modes near the minima, indicated by the vertical lines (see
notes at bottom of figure). In Year 1 there is evidence of a minor spill-over effect on wages
above the minima; in Year 2 this spillover is more pronounced and extends all the way to about
2.5 log rand per hour (R12.20); this is consistent with the fact that in Year 2 the law entitled all
domestic workers, not just those at the minimum, to a raise of at least 8 per cent.
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Narrow Definition Broad Definition
Survey Date Period Men Women All Men Women All
Sept. 2001 Year 0 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.75
Feb. 2002 Year 0 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.75
Sept. 2002 (Omit) 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.75
Mar. 2003 Year 1 0.65 0.70 0.69 0.65 0.70 0.69
Sept. 2003 Year 1 0.60 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.63
Mar. 2004 Year 2 0.64 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.67 0.66
Sept. 2004 Year 2 0.56 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.58
Year 0 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.75
Year 1 0.62 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.67 0.66
Averages
(weighted
by employment)
Year 2 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.63
Year 1 -12.0% -12.1% -12.3% -10.1% -12.1% -11.9%Pcnt. change
from Year 0 Year 2 -16.0% -16.6% -16.7% -14.9% -16.7% -16.6%
Year 1 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000Significance
of changes
(p-value) Year 2 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Figure 2: Kernal Density Plots of Log Real Hourly Wages, Men and Women, Broad Definition
Vertical lines represent the (logs of the) real values of the stipulated minima for full time workers, adjusted to September 2004 prices. Full time
workers make up roughly 80% of the sample. For March+September 2003 (Year 1, dashed lines) the nominal hourly figures were R3.33 in
lower-wage areas, and R4.10 in Area A. These rise to R3.59 and R4.42 for March+September 2004 (Year 2, solid lines). Note that the actual
effective hourly minima will be higher for the 35% of the sample who report working more than 45 regular hours per week, since they are
entitled to time-and-a-half overtime payments.
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Table 3 shows that average hours of work per week have fallen by more than 5 per cent for
women (a statistically significant change), but by at most 2 per cent for men (not significant). 
Table 3: Average Number of Hours Worked Per Week
In Table 4 we see that there has been no increase in the proportion of domestic workers who
report that they would like to work more hours, suggesting that these reductions in hours are
by mutual agreement.
Table 4: Proportion Indicating a Desire to Work Longer Hours
The Effect of Minimum Wages on the Employment and Earnings of South Africa's Domestic Service Workers
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  Narrow Definition Broad Definition 
Survey Date Period Men Women All Men Women All 
Sept. 2001 Year 0 40.2 42.5 42.1 40.6 42.6 42.3 
Feb. 2002 Year 0 39.6 43.5 42.8 39.8 43.5 42.8 
Sept. 2002 (Omit) 40.4 42.2 41.9 40.8 42.2 41.9 
Mar. 2003 Year 1 39.3 41.7 41.2 39.6 41.6 41.2 
Sept. 2003 Year 1 38.8 41.0 40.6 38.8 41.0 40.6 
Mar. 2004 Year 2 40.3 41.5 41.3 40.6 41.5 41.3 
Sept. 2004 Year 2 38.0 39.9 39.5 38.6 39.8 39.5 
Year 0 39.9 43.0 42.5 40.1 43.0 42.5 
Year 1 39.1 41.3 40.9 39.2 41.3 40.9 
Averages 
(weighted 
 by employment) 
Year 2 39.1 40.8 40.4 39.5 40.7 40.4 
Year 1 -2.0% -3.8% -3.7% -2.2% -4.0% -3.9% Pcnt. change 
from Year 0  Year 2 -2.0% -5.1% -4.8% -1.5% -5.5% -4.9% 
Year 1 0.406 0.000 0.000 0.326 0.000 0.000 Significance 
of changes 
(p-value) Year 2 0.418 0.000 0.000 0.527 0.000   0.000 
  Narrow Definition Broad Definition 
 Period Men Women All Men Women All 
Year 0 0.30 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.17 0.20 
Year 1 0.27 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.17 0.19 
Averages 
(weighted 
 by employment) 
Year 2 0.29 0.17 0.19 0.29 0.17 0.19 
Year 1 -10.9% 1.8% -0.2% -12.2% 0.2% -1.7% Pcnt. change 
from Year 0 Year 2 -2.9% -4.2% -1.4% -4.2% -3.9% -1.6% 
Year 1 0.201 0.753 0.977 0.131 0.971 0.725 Significance 
of changes 
(p-value) Year 2 0.764 0.498 0.814 0.668 0.522 0.775 
Table 5 shows that estimated average real monthly earnings increased only slightly (and
insignificantly) in Year 1, but by Year 2 had risen to 15-16 per cent above their Year 0 values,
with larger increases for women (despite their reduced hours of work). To summarise, for men 
and women under the broad definition, in the two years since the regulations went into effect
we have seen a real wage increase of about 19 per cent, combined with an hours reduction of
about 5 per cent, resulting in an increase in average earnings of about 15 per cent. It is
noteworthy that it took two years, and an increase in the minimum, before significant real
earnings gains were seen for the average employed domestic worker. It should also be
remembered that these are so far only descriptive results, with no assertion of a causal
relationship to the minimum wage regulations, although such a relationship is of course
entirely plausible.
Table 5: Average Real Monthly Earnings at September 2004 Prices
Table 6 demonstrates that full and part-time employment of women has fallen by either 9.6 or
11.8 per cent in two years, depending on the sample. For reasons that will remain largely
mysterious, employment of men has increased significantly, by 14 to 15 per cent. Combining
men and women, the net employment drop stands at 5.5 or 7.6 per cent over two years. As 
already noted, this result stands in contrast to the official figures published by StatsSA in the
statistical releases that accompany the Labour Force Surveys (and their subsequent
revisions), which show a much more gradual negative employment trend (see Figure 1), but
which are based on an inconsistent series of sampling weights.
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  Narrow Definition Broad Definition 
Survey Date Period Men Women All Men Women All 
Sept. 2001 Year 0 621 595 599 653 600 608 
Feb. 2002 Year 0 581 567 570 586 568 571 
Sept. 2002 (Omit) 523 519 519 519 518 518 
Mar. 2003 Year 1 629 571 582 620 570 581 
Sept. 2003 Year 1 626 613 615 619 625 624 
Mar. 2004 Year 2 648 656 655 657 654 655 
Sept. 2004 Year 2 684 704 700 682 706 701 
Year 0 598 581 583 615 583 589 
Year 1 628 592 599 619 597 602 
Averages 
(weighted 
 by employment) 
Year 2 667 679 677 670 679 677 
Year 1 5.0% 1.9% 2.6% 0.7% 2.4% 2.2% Pcnt. change 
from Year 0  Year 2 11.5% 17.0% 16.0% 9.0% 16.4% 15.0% 
Year 1 0.371 0.289 0.154 0.891 0.212 0.240 Significance 
of changes 
(p-value) Year 2 0.027 0.000   0.000 0.087 0.000 0.000 
Table 6: Full and Part-Time Employment (Thousands)
In Table 7 I divide the log changes in total employment by the log changes in the average real
wage to yield a crude elasticity, i.e. one that is not adjusted for any other factors that might be
influencing employment. These figures are generally positive for men, and vary between
-1.55 and -0.28 for women, depending on the sample and the time period. For women it
appears that the employment drop was relatively large in relation to the wage change in Year
1, with elasticities of -0.76 or -1.55, whereas in the second year the elasticities are much
smaller, at -0.28 and -0.38. Over the two years, the cumulative elasticity for women stood at
-0.64 under the narrow definition and -0.51 under the broad.
Table 7: Estimated Crude Elasticity of Employment with Respect to Average Wages
Elasticities are calculated as the ratio of log changes, not arithmetic percentage differences; the former have the advantage of symmetry and
additivity; the latter may be calculated by dividing the percentages reported here by those in Table 1.
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  Narrow Definition Broad Definition 
Survey Date Period Men Women All Men Women All 
Sept. 2001 Year 0 155 920 1075 170 944 1114 
Feb. 2002 Year 0 217 995 1212 228 1010 1238 
Sept. 2002 (Omit) 190 871 1061 200 887 1087 
Mar. 2003 Year 1 218 871 1089 252 934 1186 
Sept. 2003 Year 1 191 885 1076 205 920 1125 
Mar. 2004 Year 2 204 884 1088 216 920 1135 
Sept. 2004 Year 2 220 805 1025 242 845 1087 
Averages Year 0 186 957 1143 199 977 1176 
 Year 1 204 878 1082 229 927 1156 
 Year 2 212 845 1057 229 883 1111  
Year 1 9.8% -8.3% -5.3% 14.8% -5.1% -1.7% Pcnt. change 
from Year 0  Year 2 14.1% -11.8% -7.6% 15.0% -9.6% -5.5% 
Year 1 0.137 0.001 0.025 0.018 0.033 0.460 Significance 
of changes 
(p-value) Year 2 0.074 0.000 0.012 0.047 0.001 0.063 
 Narrow Definition Broad Definition 
 Men Women All Men Women All 
Years 0 àÿà  1 1.96 -1.55 -0.95 -28.11 -0.76 -0.30 
Years 0 àÿà  2 1.13 -0.64 -0.43 2.18 -0.51 -0.32 
Years 1 àÿà  2 0.56 -0.28 -0.19 0.02 -0.38 -0.33 
Table 8 documents the change in total hours worked, the combined effect of the changes in
employment and in the length of the work week. For men, the growth in employment
dominates, raising total hours by 12 or 13 per cent over two years, a marginally statistically
significant increase. For women, both changes are negative, and sum to -14 or -16 per cent. 
Table 8: Total Hours Worked Per Week (Millions)
Table 9 displays the elasticities of total hours with respect to the wage. These are again
mostly positive for men, given their increased wages and hours; for women, the two-year
figures are either -0.79 (broad definition) or -0.91 (narrow definition). As with total
employment, the elasticities were higher in Year 1 than in Year 2. 
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  Narrow Definition Broad Definition 
Survey Date Period Men Women All Men Women All 
Sept. 2001 Year 0 6.2 38.9 45.1 6.9 39.9 46.8 
Feb. 2002 Year 0 8.6 43.2 51.8 9.1 43.9 52.9 
Sept. 2002 (Omit) 7.7 36.6 44.3 8.1 37.3 45.4 
Mar. 2003 Year 1 8.6 36.3 44.9 10.0 38.9 48.9 
Sept. 2003 Year 1 7.4 36.3 43.7 7.9 37.7 45.6 
Mar. 2004 Year 2 8.2 36.7 44.9 8.8 38.2 46.9 
Sept. 2004 Year 2 8.3 32.1 40.4 9.3 33.5 42.9 
Averages Year 0 7.4 41.0 48.4 8.0 41.9 49.9 
 Year 1 8.0 36.3 44.3 9.0 38.3 47.2 
 Year 2 8.3 34.4 42.7 9.0 35.8 44.9 
Year 1 7.8% -11.6% -8.6% 12.4% -8.6% -5.3% Pcnt. change 
from Year 0  Year 2 12.0% -16.2% -11.9% 13.4% -14.4% -10.0% 
Year 1 0.262 0.000 0.000 0.061   0.000 0.028 Significance 
of changes 
(p-value) Year 2 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.001 
Table 9: Estimated Crude Elasticity of Total Hours with Respect to Average Real Hourly Wages
The cumulative effects over two years are inelastic, implying that both men and women’s total 
earnings have risen. This is documented in Table 10; the increase in total earnings stands at 8 
or 9 per cent for men and women together, which attains statistical significance at the 10 per
cent level. This consisted of a 27-29 per cent rise for men, and a 3.5 to 5 per cent increase for
women (the latter change was not significantly different from zero). Note that all of women’s
real gains came in the second year, whereas men made more steady progress.
Table 10: Total Real Monthly Earnings (Millions of Rand at September 2004 Prices)
The Effect of Minimum Wages on the Employment and Earnings of South Africa's Domestic Service Workers
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 Narrow Definition Broad Definition 
 Men Women All Men Women All 
1.57 -2.21 -1.56 -23.77 -1.32 -0.95 
0.97 -0.91 -0.69 1.97 -0.79 -0.61 
0.56 -0.39 -0.29 0.14 -0.51 -0.44 
Years 0 àÿà  1 
Years 0 àÿà  2 
Years 1 àÿà  2 
  Narrow Definition Broad Definition 
Survey Date Period Men Women All Men Women All 
Sept. 2001 Year 0 96 536 631 110 553 663 
Feb. 2002 Year 0 122 551 673 129 560 689 
Sept. 2002 (Omit) 98 444 542 102 452 554 
Mar. 2003 Year 1 136 487 623 154 523 677 
Sept. 2003 Year 1 115 532 647 121 565 686 
Mar. 2004 Year 2 130 574 704 140 594 734 
Sept. 2004 Year 2 149 552 700 163 575 738 
Averages Year 0 109 544 652 119 557 676 
 Year 1 125 510 635 138 544 682 
 Year 2 140 563 703 151 585 736 
Year 1 15.3% -6.3% -2.6% 15.3% -2.3% 0.8% Pcnt. change 
from Year 0 Year 2 28.5% 3.5% 7.7% 26.7% 5.0% 8.9% 
Year 1 0.116 0.045 0.395 0.094 0.461 0.800   Significance 
of changes 
(p-value) Year 2 0.009 0.432 0.082 0.012 0.256 0.042 
3.1  Number and Status of Unemployed Domestic Workers
The surveys allow us to track the number and situation of those non-working individuals who
report that domestic work was their last occupation. In Table 11 we see that this number has
risen from a Year 0 average of 1.29 million men and women to a Year 2 figure of 1.40 million, a 
statistically significant increase of 117,000, or 9.1 per cent. Note that the rate of growth for
men was higher, at 30 per cent despite their simultaneous increase in measured
employment, implying an increase in their labour force participation rate, possibly in response 
to the higher wages. The figure 117,000 also exceeds my largest estimate of the two year loss 
in domestic employment (86,000, Table 6, narrow definition, men plus women). In Year 2, the
majority of the 1.4 million unemployed domestics (70 per cent) reported last working three or
more years ago, and so cannot represent the recently disemployed. Among the 596,000
more recently unemployed (less than two years), only 1,600, or 0.27 per cent report receiving
UIF benefits. This is an extremely low take-up rate, and it is not rising. It may reflect a general
unawareness of the new benefit, as well as the fact that UIF registration rates still stood at
under 30 per cent among those employed in Year 2. It is also noteworthy that the average
number of months since last work has not fallen, despite the presumed influx of recently-fired
people.
Table 11: Number of Unemployed Domestic Workers, Percentage Receiving UIF Benefits, and Months
Since Last Worked
Unemployed domestics selected via industry code for last job held; the universe is all household members aged 15 and above who did not
work and were not absent from work in the last seven days but did work at some point in their lives. The months since last worked were coded
as 1-6, then six months to less than one year (which I recoded as 12); then 1 year to less than 2 years (recoded as 24); then 2 years to less
than 3 years (recoded as 36); then 3 years of more (recoded as 72).
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  Men Women Total  
Survey Date Period Number (1000s) 
Receiving 
UIF pmts. 
Months 
since last 
worked 
Number 
(1000s) 
Receiving 
UIF pmts. 
Months 
since last 
worked 
Number 
(1000s) 
Receiving 
UIF pmts. 
Months 
since last 
worked 
Sept. 2001 Year 0 91 0.00% 48.0 1242 0.24% 56.3 1333 0.22% 55.7 
Feb. 2002 Year 0 94 0.68% 42.9 1147 0.23% 55.7 1241 0.27% 54.7 
Sept. 2002 (Omit) 101 0.00% 46.2 1201 0.12% 57.4 1302 0.11% 56.5 
Mar. 2003 Year 1 109 0.50% 43.5 1255 0.12% 57.0 1364 0.15% 56.0 
Sept. 2003 Year 1 104 0.43% 48.7 1235 0.12% 57.3 1339 0.15% 56.6 
Mar. 2004 Year 2 100 0.00% 49.9 1265 0.14% 57.0 1365 0.13% 56.5 
Sept. 2004 Year 2 140 0.08% 46.6 1303 0.34% 56.5 1443 0.32% 55.6 
Averages Year 0 93 0.34% 45.5 1195 0.24% 56.0 1287 0.24% 55.3 
 Year 1 106 0.46% 46.1 1245 0.12% 57.2 1351 0.15% 56.3 
 Year 2 120 0.05% 48.1 1284 0.24% 56.7 1404 0.23% 56.0 
Year 1 15.1% 34.4% 1.4% 4.2% -47.8% 2.1% 5.0% -38.6% 1.9% Pcnt. change 
from Year 0 Year 2 30.1% -86.0% 5.8% 7.5% 2.8% 1.3% 9.1% -7.3% 1.4% 
Year 1 0.060 0.764 0.786 0.043 0.193 0.037 0.015 0.276 0.065 p-value 
(changes) Year 2 0.002 0.181 0.244 0.004 0.959 0.220 0.000 0.881 0.214 
3.2 Non-Wage Terms of Employment and Employment Relations
Figure 3 displays the trends in the various non-wage terms of employment that may be
tracked using the LFS surveys. Two of these, namely, written contracts, and paid leave were
required under the new regulations as of the first of September 2002. The share reporting
having a written contract rose from about 8 per cent to between 25 and 30 per cent.15 Paid
leave was more prevalent to begin with, and saw a smaller increase: about 17-18 per cent
reported it in Year 0, rising to 21-22 per cent in Year 2. UIF registration was required as of 30
April 2003; it rose from a Year 0 value of 3 per cent to 26-27 per cent in Year 2, at which point it 
appears to have leveled off.16 Pension and health insurance benefits are not required of
employers, yet pension benefits appear to have risen nonetheless. Health insurance
contributions17 remain at near-zero levels.
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15 The documentation relating to this question in the September 2004 LFS includes the following comment: “The
question is intended to find out if people involved in economic activities have written contracts with their
employers. Most domestic workers have written contracts but they may not know it. The interviewers are
instructed to probe and make the respondents understand that even a one-page written agreement regarding their 
work between themselves and the employers qualifies.”
16 UIF registration is not required for the 7 per cent of the sample who report working fewer than 24 hours of work per
month.  The trend in the UIF rate excluding these few is indistinguishable from the above.  The UIF Commissioner
reports that 330,000 workers had been registered by 30 April 2003 out of an estimated 800,000, for a rate of 41 per 
cent (SouthAfrica.Info 2003).  This is higher than my estimate for September of 2003 (25 per cent).
17 The question reads: “Is the organisation/ business/ enterprise/ branch where [name] works providing for
membership of, or contributions towards, membership of a medical aid fund or health insurance?”
Figure 3: Reported Non-Wage Terms of Employment
Written contracts and paid leave were required as of 1 September 2002. UIF registration was required by 30 April 2003. Pensions, union
membership, and health insurance are not required. The narrow sample definition is used; results under the broad definition are virtually
identical.
Some evidence of changes in labour market norms and institutional roles may be found in the
trend in membership in domestic workers unions, the use of labour brokers, and in the use of
third-party mediation by domestic workers with grievances. Union density rose from 1.0 per
cent in Year 0 to 2.6 per cent in Year 2, an absolutely small but proportionally large change,
which was significant at p=0.001. Counter to expectations, there has been no measured
increase, and in fact a statistically significant decline, in the share of workers who reported
being paid by a labour broker or cleaning agency (lowest line, solid circles).18  This figure fell
from 1 per cent in Year 0 to one-quarter of one percent in Year 2.
The statistics on mediated grievances come from the records of the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). From January of 2001 through August of
2002, the number of domestic worker cases referred this organisation, about 80 per cent of
which relate to allegations of unfair dismissal, averaged 764 per month (Figure 4). From
September 2002 to February 2005 the average stood at 1150, a 50 per cent increase. This
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18 In the figure, “Paid by agency” means paid by a labour broker, a contractor or agency, or “other”, as opposed to
being paid by “The establishment / enterprise / individual for which he/she works.”
probably reflects both a genuine increase in dismissals, fair and otherwise, and an increased
awareness on the part of domestic workers as to their legal rights. That awareness has been
fostered by education and outreach efforts on the part of the Commission, aimed at both
employers and employees. The spike in April and May of 2003 coincides with the highly
unpopular introduction of the UIF registration requirement, which appears to have generated
considerable friction.19 However, it is also reported that many informal “consultants” took
advantage of domestic workers, offering to take their cases to the Commission for a  fee, and
generating many unnecessary referrals in the process.
Figure 4: Domestic Worker Cases Referred to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration
Non-wage provisions (such as written contracts and paid leave) were required as of the first of September 2002. Minimum wages were
required as of 1 November 2002. UIF registration was required by 30 April 2003. The clear drop in complaints each December is comforting.
These non-wage outcomes, while interesting in their own right, also help us with the
econometrics to come. In particular, the detailed monthly accounting of referrals to the CCMA
allows us to observe the time at which relations between employers and domestics begin to
change, which in turn allows us to see whether employers acted in anticipation of the
regulations or not. I see no upward trend in complaints prior to September of 2002, the month
the non-wage requirements became effective, which suggests that Year 0 (the September of
2001 and February of 2002 surveys) is in principle a valid baseline. In September of 2002,
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19 Initial media reports emphasised the inconvenience of registration, and of a requirement that the employers’ UIF
withholdings be forwarded to the Fund monthly, even though they amount to very small sums of money.  Some of
the bureaucratic problems have since been fixed.
complaints reached an 18-month high of 954. While this might suggest that data from the
September 2002 survey should be included in the “after” period, I deemed it safer to drop this
survey wave, since some of the regulatory provisions were in effect at that time, but others
(namely, minimum wages) were still pending.20
Furthermore, like the minimum wage itself, the requirements of UIF enrolment, written
contracts, and paid leave also impose costs on employers, and the question arises whether
the employment declines we have seen are causally related to these various additional costs, 
and whether the impact of the wage and non-wage costs can be separately identified.
  4.  Econometric Evidence
Many studies of minimum wages examine the effects of a relatively long series of small
changes in nationwide or statewide minima that apply to all, or most, occupations and
employers. In the present case, we have a short time series during which an
occupation-specific minimum is introduced de novo, set above the median wage for that
occupation, and then raised once, two surveys later. Despite the short period of observation,
the size of the initial intervention suggests that any effects on wages, hours, and employment
should be readily identifiable, and the descriptive data certainly seem to bear this out, more
clearly for women than men. One way to test for a causal link between the regulations and the 
employment change is to compare the evolution of employment for domestic workers to that
of a control group: but which one?  Higher-wage domestic workers are not directly affected by 
the introduction of the Year 1 minimum, but appear, from the evidence in Figure 2, to have
been affected by the across-the-board wage hikes required in Year 2. Other so-called
unskilled occupations are also not directly affected, but this comparison yields meaningful
results only if their observed employment trend is in fact a good proxy for what would have
happened to domestic workers absent the regulatory intervention. But why should we believe
that the employment trends of, say, farm workers, truck drivers, retail trade workers, or
miners, whose industries are subject to countless idiosyncratic influences (including their
own sector-specific minimum wages) represent the right counterfactual?
The approach I adopt resembles one of Card and Krueger’s cross-state analyses (1995, pp.
127-137) insofar as it focuses on regional variation in the impact of the minimum wage; the
definition of region is discussed below. This variation is both absolute (the Area A minima are
higher than elsewhere) and relative (the share who fall below any given minimum, or the
relation between the minimum and the average wage, varies by region). The first step is to
ask whether regions in which the initial share earning less than the minimum was largest also
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20 This decision is not without consequence: September 2002 was a particularly bad month for wages, monthly
earnings, and employment, as may be seen from Tables 1, 5, and 6. Classifying it either before or after makes a
real difference to some observed trends.
saw the largest wage increases.21 If so, we treat this as evidence that the regulations raised
wages as intended. Once this is established, we ask whether these regions also saw the
largest decreases in either hours per week or the domestic worker employment-to-population 
ratio,22 and if the answer is yes we have evidence of a negative effect of the minimum wage
on hours or jobs. Analogously, we may ask whether regions in which the shares reporting UIF
withholdings, written contracts, and paid leave are lowest (in other words, the regions where
non-compliance with the pending regulations was highest) were also the regions in which
employment fell fastest (or grew most slowly) once the regulations went into effect. If so, we
have indirect evidence that the cost of complying with the non-wage provisions has led some
employers to lay off their domestic workers. Finally, we may include both the wage and
non-wage factors in the same equation to see if separate effects can be identified. 
In the wage equations reported in Tables 12 and 13, the primary explanatory variable is the
fraction in a given region who, in Year 0, are estimated to fall below the hourly minimum wage
that becomes law in Year 1. The outcome to be explained is the change in mean log wages,
by region. The entire analysis is stratified by gender, primarily because the observed
employment changes for men and women were of opposite sign. The models are then run for
Year 0 versus Year 2, to estimate a cumulative effect, and a third set compare Years 1 and 2,
to see if the increase in the minimum made any difference.23  A significant positive coefficient
for the share below the minimum is expected. The identifying assumption is that there are no
other reasons that low-wage regions should experience faster domestic worker wage growth
than high-wage regions. To make this assumption more palatable, two further variables are
included as general measures of changes in labour market conditions that might be
correlated, whether causally or spuriously, with the realized sample’s regional shares below
the minimum. These are the rate of growth of real hourly wages of similar workers in other
occupations, and the change in their employment-to-population ratio.24 Both of these are
assumed to measure the growth of overall labour demand for similar people, and are
expected to display positive coefficients in the wage equation.
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21 The fraction below the minimum is analogous to Card and Krueger’s (1995) “fraction affected” since this is defined
as the share who fall between the old minimum (in this case, 0) and the new.  Brown (1999, p. 2130) notes that
these measures of the degree of impact of minimum wage changes are “conceptually cleaner” than relative wage
measures such as the Kaitz index.
22 The log change in the level of domestic employment is an alternative to the employment-to-population ratio, but
the latter is preferred for two reasons: it controls for actual changes in population over time, which are presumably
not dictated by the minimum wage, and it reduces the effects of sampling error if the sample’s
employment-to-population ratios are less variable than its employment levels, as seems reasonable. 
23 For the Year 1/Year 2 model, the share below the minimum in Year 1 is calculated in relation to the higher
minimum that came into effect in Year 2; in other words, it quantifies the fraction to be affected by the Year 2
minimum.  This is a cosmetic change, as the two measures are correlated at 0.93 to 0.98.  (Note that this departs
from Card and Krueger, who define the faction affected as the share falling between the old and new minima.  But
this is in order to allow for non-covered workers in the U.S. setting, and does not apply here.)
24 The “similar” workers are employed African and Coloured men and women between the ages of 15 and 65 with
less than a high school education who were not employed as domestic workers under either definition.
A problem that immediately arises is the fact that a region might have a low measured
average hourly wage because of an unusually large number of negative random errors in the
measurement of individual earnings (or positive errors in the measurement of hours). If these
errors are independent over time and have an expected value of zero, then in the next period
that seemingly low-wage region should no longer display a net negative measurement error,
creating the impression that its wages are rising faster than those of other regions, and
generating an upwardly biased estimate of the effect of the minimum wage on the average
wage. This problem may be acute if samples or regions are small, so that the average
measurement error across workers need not be near zero. The solution is to create regions
that are large enough to reduce this bias to acceptable levels. However, as we group a given
number of individual observations into fewer, larger regions, we reduce the sample size of the 
regression just described, and also reduce the variance of the explanatory variable, both of
which reduce the precision of our estimates.
A second potential source of bias lies in the possibility that sub-minimum wage employers in
high-wage regions might react differently when the minimum wage is introduced than do
employers in low-wage regions. Suppose it were the case that sub-minimum employers who
live in urban areas are more likely to raise wages to comply with the new regulations than
those in lower-wage regions, either because of differences in social norms, or in the level of
awareness of their workers, or in the level of enforcement, or in the perceived difficulty of
“finding good help these days.” Put differently, suppose non-compliant employers in
lower-wage rural areas are more likely to thumb their noses at the Minister of Labour. Such
behaviour would tend to bias the coefficient on the share below the minimum downwards,
since it leads to more widespread increases in compliance, and hence in average wages, in
regions with lower initial shares below the minimum, offsetting the expected positive
association. This offset is undesirable, because the actions of the more compliant employers
are still attributable to the minimum wage.
One way to test this hypothesis is to use the initial shares reporting UIF registration, written
contracts, paid leave, and pensions, none of which were required prior to the regulations, and
all of which are positively correlated with regional wage levels, as predictors of this
heterogeneity in employer behaviour. We then ask: (a) whether any of these variables display 
a significant positive association with subsequent wage increases, conditional on the share
below the minimum; and (b) whether their inclusion serves to raise the coefficient on the
share below the minimum. If both answers are yes, I would argue that the non-wage variables 
belong in the equation.25
In the second step, the share of the region’s workers who fall below the minimum is used to
explain the subsequent change in the average weekly hours worked by domestics, and in the
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25 Note that if the non-wage measures have no independent impact on the wage, and are merely providing some
additional information about the (poorly measured) share below the minimum, then they should enter positively in
the equation but their inclusion should reduce the coefficient on the share below the minimum.
ratio of the number of African and Coloured women (or men) who are domestic workers to the 
overall number of adult (15 or older) women (or men) in the African and Coloured population.
Together the two steps amount to an instrumental variables approach, where the share below 
the minimum serves as an instrument for the log wage change. The rationale for adopting this 
approach is that if we were instead simply to regress employment changes against wage
changes, we would run the risk of observing a positive correlation that is driven by omitted
factors – a classic case of the supply/demand identification problem. For example, an
increase in middle-class incomes in a given region could lead to an increase in demand for
domestic help, and a demand-driven increase in their wage. This would tend to obscure any
negative employment effects of the minimum wage. Using the initial share below the
minimum as an instrument will solve this problem, provided there is no correlation between
that share and factors other than the wage that affect domestic employment, but are omitted
from the analysis (factors such as subsequent changes in middle-class incomes, for
example). Otherwise put, the identifying assumption in the employment equation is that,
absent the regulatory intervention in the wage, low-wage and high-wage regions would
experience the same absolute changes in the domestic worker employment-to-population
ratio. Here we may again include our two measures of changes in the non-domestic labour
market as controls.
In the employment regression, unlike the wage equation, we need not worry about
mean-reverting measurement errors in wages causing an upward bias; instead, we should be 
concerned about attenuation bias if wages are poorly measured and our regions are small. To 
explore this issue, I considered three levels of regional aggregation. The finest is at the level
of the 353 magisterial districts; of these, roughly 300 contain at least one female domestic
worker in each time period, but only 220 or so have any men. The next level is that of the 262
municipalities, roughly 200 of which are usable (150 for men), and the most aggregated is at
the level of the 53 district councils.
To test the robustness of the results, I estimate a host of plausible specifications for men and
women, at each of the three levels of aggregation, and each of the three time period
comparisons. These include: using least squares (OLS) versus least absolute deviations
(LAD), in order to explore the influence of outliers; including or excluding regional weights,
which measure the number of domestic workers at the start of the period26; using both the
broad and the narrow definitions, which display different crude wage-employment elasticities; 
and including or excluding the four non-wage variables and the two general labour market
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26 If large and small regions display similar wage/employment relationships, the weights should not matter in large
samples, but in smaller samples, such as these, the weighted and unweighted results may diverge considerably. 
Moreover, if large and small regions respond differently, the weights will matter.  Unfortunately, in this case,
neither the weighted nor the unweighted results are consistent estimators of the population-weighted average of
the response coefficients for different-sized regions (see, for example, Deaton 1997).  I treat them all as plausible,
if imperfect, estimators, and assess robustness by comparing their results.  Note that the weights should reduce
the effects of measurement error by down-weighting the smaller regions, in which noise is likely to be larger in
relation to signal.  A final problem is that employment/population ratios should be weighted by total population,
while wages and hours should be weighted by the number of domestic workers; neither set of weights will preserve 
the sample means of both the dependent and the independent variables once the data are broken into regions.
controls. All told, I report summary results for 432 equations for each outcome (wages, hours, 
employment).
The OLS employment equations may also be recast explicitly as instrumental variables
estimates, with the share below the minimum serving as an instrument for the log wage
change. In this framework, we may then allow the non-wage variables to enter as additional
instruments for the log wage change. This would be justified if we find evidence that the
non-wage variables do indeed have significant independent effects on the wage (as
hypothesised), and if they appear to affect employment only through their effect on the wage.
 4.1 Results: Wages
Table 12 reports the results of 18 representative wage regressions, run at the district council
level in hopes of minimising measurement error bias. The equations are estimated via
ordinary least squares in the narrowly defined sample; results under the full set of
specifications are summarised in the next table. In the first column of the upper panel
(women), the coefficient for the share below the minimum is 0.445 and clearly significant,
implying that if we compare two districts whose initial shares below the minimum differ by
0.10, we would expect to see a difference in their subsequent wage growth rates of 4.45
percentage points; for men (lower panel) the effect appears stronger, at 8.56 points, although
it is estimated with less precision.27
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27 Recall that women outnumber men in the domestic worker sample by about 5:1.
Table 12: Least Squares Regression of Change in Mean Log Real Hourly Wage Against Initial Share
Below Minimum (Narrow Definition, District Councils, No Weights)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; † significant at 5%; ‡ significant at 1%
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Women 
Change in mean log wage 
Year 0à  ÿà1 
Change in mean log wage 
Year 0à  ÿà2 
Change in mean log wage 
Year 1à  ÿà2 
0.445 ‡ 0.405 ‡ 0.503 ‡ 0.357 † 0.355 † 0.501 ‡ 0.158 0.138 0.298 ‡Share initially below 
minimum (0.128) (0.132) (0.136) (0.140) (0.139) (0.149) (0.140) (0.131) (0.144) 
 0.263 0.199  0.070 0.066  0.162 0.175 Change in log non-dom. 
wage  (0.186) (0.193)  (0.115) (0.125)  (0.130) (0.140) 
-0.404 -0.971 0.394 0.221 -0.135 -0.214Change in non-dom. 
emp./pop.  (0.698) (0.698)  (0.502) (0.476)  (0.460) (0.470) 
 1.396* -0.863 0.416*Share initially having 
UIF   (0.822)   (0.597)   (0.245) 
  0.163   0.913 †   -0.001 Share initially having 
Contract  (0.517)   (0.438)   (0.167) 
 -0.317 0.285 -0.008Share initially having 
Paid Leave   (0.272)   (0.214)   (0.171) 
0.816 0.427 0.612*Share initially having 
Pension   (0.765)   (0.635)   (0.345) 
-0.257* -0.232* -0.351* -0.067 -0.065 -0.262* 0.000 0.004 -0.219Intercept 
(0.104) (0.107) (0.135) (0.112) (0.109) (0.139) (0.112) (0.106) (0.140) 
0.16 0.20 0.31 0.14 0.15 0.31 0.04 0.07 0.22
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Men    
0.856* 0.884 † 0.866* 0.850 ‡ 0.885 ‡ 0.904 ‡ 0.668 ‡ 0.576 ‡ 0.637 ‡Share initially below 
minimum (0.445) (0.433) (0.509) (0.192) (0.200) (0.222) (0.188) (0.186) (0.211) 
 0.358 0.298 0.031 0.035 0.611† 0.649† Change in log non-dom. 
wage  (0.480) (0.501)  (0.295) (0.322)  (0.277) (0.312) 
2.326 2.035 1.775* 2.026* 2.614 3.176*Change in non-dom. 
emp./pop.   (1.581) (1.714)  (0.987) (1.053)  (1.606) (1.604) 
  0.255 -0.499 0.007Share initially having 
UIF (0.475)   (0.434)   (0.610) 
0.248 0.210 0.090Share initially having 
Contract (0.440) (0.388) (0.458)
  0.242 0.604 0.084Share initially having 
Paid Leave (0.391)   (0.418)   (0.376) 
  -0.582   -0.287   0.397 Share initially having 
Pension   (1.418)   (1.058)   (0.551) 
-0.640* -0.609* -0.613 -0.524 ‡ -0.531 ‡ -0.560 ‡ 0.363 ‡ -0.369 ‡ -0.436 ‡ Intercept 
 (0.361) (0.357) (0.449) (0.135) (0.144) (0.167) (0.125) (0.138) (0.161) 
R  0.22 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.33 0.36 0.26 0.36 0.37 
N 51 51 51 52 52 52 51 51 51 
The next column adds the controls for the rate of growth of real hourly wages for similar
workers in other occupations, and the change in their employment-to-population ratios. The
wage variable’s coefficient is positive in all 12 equations in which it appears (as expected) but
significant at the 10 per cent level in just two (men, last two columns). The employment
variable enters with insignificant positive and negative signs for women; it is positive and
significant in three of the six equations for men. The estimated effect of the share below the
minimum is generally robust to the inclusion of these controls, for both men and women.
The next columns add the four non-wage variables. For women, these raise the estimated
effect of the minimum wage (by 0.10 or more), and also add between 0.09 and 0.16 to the
values of R2. The share reporting UIF deductions has a significant positive effect in two
equations, the shares with contracts and pensions each contribute one positive significant
term, and there are no significant negative terms, lending some support to the hypothesis of
heterogeneity in the employers’ responses. For men, however, the non-wage variables make
little difference.
Table 13 summarises the results of the 432 different specifications, and several points
emerge. First, for women, the response of the average wage to the minimum is weaker in the
Year 1/Year 2 comparisons than in the Year 0/Year 1 equations; for men, however, the
coefficients appear, if anything, to rise over time. Second, for women the coefficients increase 
as we move to finer levels of disaggregation, which is consistent with, but not diagnostic of, an 
increasing effect of mean-reverting measurement error bias. For men, this pattern is less
clear. Third, for both men and women the weighted estimates are generally smaller than the
unweighted figures. This may be because the weights reduce the influence of the smaller
regions, for which average measurement errors are likely to be largest, but it may also be the
case that smaller regions display a different wage response than larger ones.
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Table 13: Regression of Change in Mean Log Real Wage Against Initial Share Below Minimum:
Summary of Parameter Estimates for Share Below Minimum Under 432 Different Specifications
Estimated under least squares and least absolute deviations; with and without weights; using narrow and broad definitions. Then add controls
for change in mean log wage for non-domestic workers and change in non-domestic employment to population ratio; then add controls for
initial share in compliance with three non-wage provisions (UIF, contract, paid leave) and share offering pension. Significance is defined at the
10% level.
The final columns categorise the parameter estimates for the share below the minimum
according to sign and statistical significance at the 10 per cent level. Overall, 398 out of 432
equations yield a significant coefficient of the expected sign, and just four yielded negative
estimates, of which none was significant. This leaves little room for doubt that minimum
wages raised average wages from Year 0 to Year 1, and also from Year 0 to Year 2. For men,
the effect from Year 1 to Year 2 is equally strong, while for women the effect becomes weaker.
I would argue, however, that there is still evidence of an effect for women from Year 1 to Year
2, and that the average coefficient at the district council level (0.11) is a reasonable estimate
of its magnitude. Although the coefficient was significant in only 9 of the 24 equations it may
be that with just 53 observations we lack the power reliably to detect an effect of this size. The
results from the more disaggregated datasets, although upwardly biased to an unknown
degree, also support the claim that minimum wages mattered in Year 2.
Table 14 summarises the results for the other explanatory variables that appear in the wage
equation. The change in the non-domestic wage displays a modest effect on domestic wages 
for women, having a positive and significant coefficient in 48 of 144 equations, with an
average cross-elasticity of wages of 0.11. For men the effect is weaker, with an average
coefficient of just 0.03. By contrast, the non-domestic employment variable accomplishes
little for women, but has a generally positive effect on male employment. Finally, the four
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Women 
Years  Mean
 
estimate 
Mean 
estimate: 
no weights 
Mean 
estimate: 
weights 
Negative 
 & 
significant 
Negative 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
 & 
significant 
District
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0à ÿà1
 
0.429
 
0.482
 
0.376
 
0
 
0
 
3
 
21
 
 
0à ÿà2
 
0.356
 
0.406
 
0.305
 
0
 
0
 
3
 
21
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0.110
 
0.168
 
0.052
 
0
 
4
 
11
 
9
 
Municipalities
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0.565
 
0.693
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0
 
0
 
0
 
24
 
 
0à ÿà2
 
0.411
 
0.540
 
0.283
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
24
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0.108
 
0
 
0
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Districts
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0
 
0
 
0
 
24
 
 
0à ÿà2
 
0.486
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0.439
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
24
 
 
1à ÿà2
 
0.296
 
0.420
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0
 
0
 
0
 
24
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0à ÿà1
 
0.528
 
0.619
 
0.438
 
0
 
0
 
3
 
69
 
 
0à ÿà2
 
0.418
 
0.493
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0
 
0
 
3
 
69
 
 
1à 2 0.215 0.319 0.110 0 4 17 51
 
All
 
0.387
 
0.477
 
0.297
 
0
 
4
 
23
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District Councils 
 
0à ÿà1
 
0.578
 
0.659
 
0.498
 
0
 
0
 
4
 
20
 
 
0à ÿà2
 
0.771
 
0.760
 
0.782
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
24
 
 
1à ÿà2
 
0.757
 
0.767
 
0.747
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
24
 
Municipalities
 
0à ÿà1
 
0.662
 
0.883
 
0.441
 
0
 
0
 
3
 
21
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0.642
 
0.654
 
0.630
 
0
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0
 
24
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0.728
 
0.737
 
0.718
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0
 
0
 
24
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0à ÿà1
 
0.766
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0.635
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
24
 
 
0à ÿà2
 
0.810
 
0.782
 
0.839
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
24
 
 
1à ÿà2
 
0.786
 
0.865
 
0.707
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
24
 
Averages /Totals 
 
0à ÿà1
 
0.669
 
0.813
 
0.525
 
0
 
0
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0
 
0
 
0
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1à 2 0.757 0.790 0.724 0 0 0 72
 
All
 
0.722
 
0.778
 
0.666
 
0
 
0
 
7
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non-wage terms of employment have a generally positive effect for women, but display net
negative effects in three of four cases for men. These variables may be of some limited use as 
additional instruments for the change in wages in an employment equation. The F-test of their 
joint effect is significant in just 26 of the 72 cases for women, and 25 of 72 for men, but this
includes cases in which some of the individual terms are significant but with the wrong (i.e.
negative) sign. Moreover, just 17 of these 51 significant estimates came from the 72 OLS
versions of the equation, which we will later want to extend to two-stage least squares
estimates. This implies that adding these instruments might not substantially alter our
estimates. 
Table 14: Regression of Change in Mean Log Real Wage Against Initial Share Below Minimum:
Summary of Results For Other Explanatory Variables Under Different Specifications
See notes to Table 13
4.2  Results: Hours
Table 15 reports a representative subset of regressions for hours per week, this time at the
magisterial district level; Table 16 summarises the full set of 432. These unambiguously
support the proposition that minimum wages have reduced hours worked, for both men and
women, with 340 negative and significant estimates, another 91 negative but insignificant
results, and just one positive estimate, which did not attain statistical significance at the 10
per cent level. Taking the overall average estimates for men and for women from Table 16 we
may infer that a low-wage district whose sub-minimum share was 0.1 above the national
mean would see a reduction in hours worked of about three-quarters of an hour for women,
and 0.9 hours for men, on top of the change experienced by the average district.
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Women 
Average 
coefficient 
Negative 
 & 
significant 
Negative 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
 & 
significant 
Total  
Change in log non-dom. 
hourly wage 0.110 7 15 74 48 144 
Change in log non-dom. 
emp/pop ratio -0.050 20 61 50 13 144 
Share initially having UIF 0.069 0 27 32 13 72 
Share initially having 
Contract 0.282 4 7 37 24 72 
Share initially having 
Paid Leave 0.058 4 21 35 12 72 
Share initially having 
Pension 0.186 6 17 40 9 72 
 
Men 
      
Change in log non-dom. 
hourly wage 0.033 10 53 64 17 144 
Change in log non-dom. 
emp/pop ratio 0.851 3 15 86 40 144 
Share initially having UIF -0.034 14 28 21 9 72 
Share initially having 
Contract -0.124 10 35 23 4 72 
Share initially having 
Paid Leave 0.140 3 16 40 13 72 
Share initially having 
Pension -0.183 10 29 23 10 72 
Table 15: Least Absolute Deviations Regressions of Change in Average Hours of Work per Week
Against Initial Share Below Minimum (Narrow Definition, Magisterial Districts, No Weights)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; † significant at 5%; ‡ significant at 1%
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Women 
Change in hours/week 
Year 0à?1 
Change in hours/week 
Year 0à?2 
Change in hours/week 
Year 1à?2 
-10.75‡ -10.50† -13.06‡ -6.21‡ -5.69† -8.44†  -5.31† -5.63† -7.21†Share initially below 
minimum (3.93) (4.15) (3.44) (2.28) (2.56) (3.40) (2.56) (2.58) (3.18) 
-2.71 -2.66 -1.59 -3.41* -6.42‡ -5.81†Change in log non-dom. 
wage (2.85) (2.27)  (1.53) (1.96)  (2.21) (2.59) 
12.23 14.59* 9.31 9.77 -12.55 -8.76Change in non-dom. 
emp./pop.  (10.78) (8.45)  (5.77) (7.41)  (7.95) (9.42) 
  8.01   4.14   1.08 Share initially having 
UIF (7.68)   (8.28)   (5.92) 
-10.13 -0.80 -0.20Share initially having 
Contract (6.64)   (5.86)   (4.22) 
3.33 -3.51 -3.97Share initially with Paid 
Leave (4.73)   (4.54)   (4.18) 
-23.67 -22.91 -12.37Share initially having 
Pension (15.06)   (13.90)   (9.36) 
7.33†  7.63†  10.28‡ 2.42 2.27 6.01* 3.07 3.50 6.00 Intercept 
 (3.32) (3.50) (3.14) (1.93) (2.13) (3.06) (2.07) (2.06) (2.90) 
Pseudo-R2 0.035 0.044 0.064 0.012 0.017 0.029 0.012 0.029 0.044 
N 300 299 299 300 299 299 293 293 293 
Men    
-8.20† -8.24† -7.17* -5.99* -4.88 -5.09 -8.05† -7.59† -7.99†Share initially below 
minimum (3.77) (3.56) (3.79) (3.54) (3.98) (3.91) (3.19) (3.46) (3.87) 
-6.53 -8.57* -3.85 -4.17 -3.69 5.96Change in log non-dom. 
wage  (4.42) (4.55)  (4.04) (3.82)  (4.31) (4.67) 
-6.83 2.83 17.27 17.07 -15.56 23.44Change in non-dom. 
emp./pop.   (14.07) (14.62)  (14.64) (15.36)  (15.17) (17.18) 
-6.21 -1.23 5.30Share initially having 
UIF   (8.06)   (8.75)   (5.67) 
-1.08 6.63 0.84Share initially having 
Contract (7.27)   (8.23)   (4.45) 
2.84 -9.32 3.86Share initially with Paid 
Leave (5.01)   (6.12)   (5.45) 
3.99 -9.27 -3.71Share initially having 
Pension (15.55)   (15.21)   (7.86) 
4.96 4.84 4.57 2.93 3.39 4.83 6.20† 5.98† 7.61†Intercept 
 (3.14) (2.99) (3.27) (2.95) (3.28) (3.30) (2.58) (2.81) (3.26)
Pseudo-R2 0.023 0.037 0.048 0.009 0.017 0.027 0.021 0.023 0.028
N 168 168 165 182 182 178 176 176 175 
Table 16: Regression of Change in Average Hours Per Week Against Initial Share Below Minimum:
Summary of Parameter Estimates for Share Below Minimum Under 432 Different Specifications
Estimated under least squares and least absolute deviations; with and without weights; using narrow and broad definitions. Then add controls
for change in mean log wage for non-domestic workers and change in non-domestic employment to population ratio; then add controls for
initial share in compliance with three non-wage provisions (UIF, contract, paid leave) and share offering pension. Significance is defined at the
10% level.
In Table 17, the change in the wage of similar workers in other occupations appears to exert a
negative effect on the length of the domestic work week (the effect is significant in 74 of 288
equations) while the employment control variable yields estimates that are all over the map.
Most of the non-wage variables, which I have interpreted as measures of employer
generosity of sorts, display predominantly negative effects on hours of work. This could mean 
that more conscientious employers are moving more quickly to conform to the 45 hour
maximum regular work week. Or it may be that the ability of these variables to add information 
about changes in log wages, documented in Table 17, also enables them to predict the
consequent changes in hours.
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Women 
Years Mean estimate 
Mean 
estimate: 
no weights 
Mean 
estimate: 
weights 
Negative 
 & 
significant 
Negative 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
 & 
significant 
District Councils  0àÿà1 -7.70 -7.30 -8.09 16 8 0 0 
 0àÿà2 -7.05 -5.75 -8.35 17 7 0 0 
 1àÿà2 -4.26 -4.06 -4.47 11 12 1 0 
Municipalities 0àÿà1 -8.76 -11.91 -5.60 20 4 0 0 
 0àÿà2 -5.10 -2.26 -7.94 12 12 0 0 
 1àÿà2 -7.01 -7.61 -6.40 24 0 0 0 
Magisterial Districts 0àÿà1 -10.95 -13.81 -8.09 24 0 0 0 
 0àÿà2 -8.54 -7.19 -9.89 24 0 0 0 
 1àÿà2 -8.01 -7.21 -8.80 24 0 0 0 
Averages /Totals  0àÿà1 -9.13 -11.01 -7.26 60 12 0 0 
 0àÿà2 -6.89 -5.06 -8.73 53 19 0 0 
 1àÿà2 -6.43 -6.29 -6.56 59 12 1 0 
 All -7.48 -7.45 -7.51 172 43 1 0 
Men 
 
        
District Councils  0àÿà1 -9.54 -11.33 -7.76 14 10 0 0 
 0àÿà2 -11.79 -12.94 -10.63 15 9 0 0 
 1àÿà2 -13.22 -14.48 -11.96 23 1 0 0 
Municipalities 0àÿà1 -11.33 -12.05 -10.61 24 0 0 0 
 0àÿà2 -7.47 -6.71 -8.22 19 5 0 0 
 1àÿà2 -11.70 -12.47 -10.93 20 4 0 0 
Magisterial Districts 0àÿà1 -6.89 -7.19 -6.59 17 7 0 0 
 0àÿà2 -6.41 -5.81 -7.00 12 12 0 0 
 1àÿà2 -10.76 -12.19 -9.34 24 0 0 0 
Averages /Totals  0àÿà1 -8.32 -10.19 -9.25 55 17 0 0 
 0àÿà2 -8.62 -8.49 -8.56 46 26 0 0 
 1à2 -10.74 -13.05 -11.89 67 5 0 0
 All -9.23 -10.58 -9.90 168 48 0 0 
Table 17: Regression of Change in Average Hours Per Week Against Initial Share Below Minimum:
Summary of Results For Other Explanatory Variables Under Different Specifications
See Notes to Table 16
4.3 Results: Jobs
Table 18 reports a representative set of employment regressions, again using unweighted
OLS at the magisterial district level. The first column in each block uses the share below the
minimum as the sole explanatory variable of the change in the domestic service
employment-to-population ratio; this term ought to enter negatively, as it predicts a rise in
wages. The second column adds changes in both non-domestic wages and the
non-domestic employment-to-population ratio. The non-domestic wage could display a
negative sign if higher alternative wages serve to raise the (imperfectly measured) domestic
wage, and so reduce employment; or they could display a positive sign if they signal an
increase in general labour demand, including demand for domestic help.28 The expected sign 
of the non-domestic employment variable is also not obvious: a rise in alternative
employment might tempt domestics away from their jobs (again subject to the footnoted
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Women 
Average 
coefficient 
Negative 
 & 
significant 
Negative 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
 & 
significant 
Total  
Change in log non-dom. 
hourly wage -2.20 48 64 29 3 144 
Change in log non-dom. 
emp/pop ratio 2.32 28 40 53 23 144 
Share initially having UIF 3.50 0 16 42 14 72 
Share initially having 
Contract -5.52 15 43 14 0 72 
Share initially having 
Paid Leave -1.59 13 32 24 3 72 
Share initially having 
Pension -12.88 32 27 9 4 72 
 
Men 
      
Change in log non-dom. 
hourly wage -3.30 26 84 33 1 144 
Change in log non-dom. 
emp/pop ratio -13.80 31 51 43 19 144 
Share initially having UIF -0.29 4 39 19 10 72 
Share initially having 
Contract -5.22 22 32 11 7 72 
Share initially having 
Paid Leave -8.61 36 28 8 0 72 
Share initially having 
Pension -12.90 23 39 8 2 72 
28 The link between domestic and non-domestic wages may be weak given South Africa’s extraordinarily high rates
of open unemployment, which stood at 36 per cent for African women in September of 2004, by the official
definition, and at 56 per cent by the expanded definition (which counts the non-searching, discouraged
unemployed as economically active).
proviso), or it might also signal a general increase in income, and hence in demand for
domestic work (a more plausible argument in a labour surplus economy).
Table 18: Least Squares Regressions of Change in Domestic Employment to Population Ratio Against
Initial Share Below Minimum (Broad Definition, Magisterial Districts, No Weights):
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; † significant at 5%; ‡ significant at 1%
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Women 
Change in domestic emp/pop  
Year 0à?1 
Change in domestic emp/pop  
Year 0à?2 
Change in domestic emp/pop  
Year 1à?2 
0.012 0.017 0.012 -0.042† -0.034* -0.047† -0.043‡ -0.039‡ -0.043‡Share initially below 
minimum (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
-0.029† -0.026† -0.028† -0.031† -0.014 -0.013Change in log non-
dom. wage  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.013)  (0.009) (0.009) 
 0.068 0.064  0.049 0.046  0.132‡ 0.132†  Change in non-dom. 
emp./pop.  (0.064) (0.061)  (0.047) (0.044)  (0.050) (0.052) 
0.003 0.014 -0.001Share initially having 
UIF (0.053)   (0.057)   (0.026) 
  -0.095†   -0.065   -0.016 Share initially having 
Contract (0.043)   (0.045)   (0.016) 
  0.008   -0.029   -0.011 Share initially with 
Paid Leave (0.021)   (0.030)   (0.022) 
0.006 -0.147* 0.012Share initially having 
Pension (0.106)   (0.088) (0.042) 
-0.020* -0.022† -0.012 0.013 0.010 0.034* 0.021* 0.020* 0.028* Intercept 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) 
R  0.00 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.10 
N 304 303 303 301 300 300 297 297 297 
Men    
-0.006 -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.018 -0.019 -0.021† -0.020† -0.022†Share initially below 
minimum (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
0.039* 0.041* 0.030 0.030 -0.024 -0.025Change in log non-
dom. wage (0.022) (0.023)  (0.025) (0.025)  (0.018) (0.019) 
-0.016 -0.014 -0.036 -0.041 0.054 0.041Change in non-dom. 
emp./pop.  (0.091) (0.094)  (0.053) (0.055)  (0.054) (0.055) 
-0.007 0.030 -0.014Share initially having 
UIF (0.040)   (0.020)   (0.017) 
  0.005   -0.024   0.013 Share initially having 
Contract (0.040)   (0.025)   (0.019) 
0.022 0.006 -0.003Share initially with 
Paid Leave (0.033)   (0.017)   (0.018) 
-0.019 -0.036* -0.011Share initially having 
Pension (0.096)   (0.022)   (0.021) 
0.066‡ 0.070‡ 0.067‡ 0.058‡ 0.058‡ 0.059‡ 0.062‡ 0.064‡ 0.065‡Intercept 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Pseudo-R2 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 
N 228 228 226 227 227 225 223 223 221 
The third column in each block presents the full model, with added controls for the non-wage
requirements, namely, the initial shares reporting UIF registration, written contracts, and paid
leave. If indeed these variables have significant independent positive effects on wages, then
they ought also to have independent negative effects on employment. On the other hand,
they could have positive signs if compliance with these requirements is costly (and
enforcement is serious), since we would expect the smallest employment declines (or largest
increases) in regions where ex ante rates of compliance were highest. The pension variable
should enter negatively for the first reason, and is not subject to the second argument since it
is not a required term of employment.
No significant effect of the minimum wage is found in the comparison of Year 0 and Year 1, in
any of the six specifications shown. However, the cumulative effect from Year 0 to Year 2
(middle three columns) is negative and significant at the 10 per cent level or better in all three
of the women’s equations, but much smaller, and insignificant, for the men. For women, this
suggests that there was a lag in wage and employment adjustments on the part of employers. 
The Year 1/Year 2 parameters (final three columns) are significant for both men and women,
and are twice as large for women as men. The significant Year 2 results for men are
remarkable: they imply that their modest employment gains in Year 2 occurred despite the
negative effects of the minimum wage. The descriptive results appear to be confounded by
the operation of other forces that were working to raise male domestic worker employment
even as the minimum wage worked to reduce it. Some of these forces are captured by the
other covariates, but these had only modest effects for men; the main factors responsible for
men’s job growth remain buried in the intercepts, which are uniformly positive and significant.
The breakdown of the 432 estimates appears in Table 19. All told, significant negative
minimum wage effects outnumber significant positive effects by 121 to 3; of the remaining
308 results, 196 are negative and 112 positive. There is no clear evidence of an effect in Year
1 over Year 0 for women, but 10 of 72 equations for men yield significant negative coefficients
in that period. For Year 2 versus either Year 0 or Year 1, between one third and not quite half
of the wage coefficients are negative and significant for men and women.29 The average
cumulative two-year effect for women was -0.017, compared to -0.013 for men. For women,
whose employment fell, the coefficient means that an increase (across regions) in the share
below the minimum of 0.1 corresponds to an additional reduction in the employment to
population ratio of 0.0017. Given that the observed regional average change in the
employment ratio was on the order of -0.0100, this would add entail a 17 per cent greater
reduction in employment in the lower-wage region than in its higher-wage neighbour. For
men, the mean region saw a gain of about 0.0250 in the employment ratio. A region that was
0.1 above the average in its sub-minimum share, however, would be predicted to see a gain
of just 0.0237, or a 5 per cent smaller gain. Overall, the weighted and unweighted
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29 An earlier version of this paper (Hertz, 2004), which was presented at the 2004 DPRU/TIPS conference, and
which received some attention in the media, was based on data from Year 0 and Year 1 only, (the Year 2 data not
yet being available).  Using methods similar but inferior to the above, and pooling men and women, it found no
evidence of a disemployment effect, which is consistent with the present finding for that time period.
specifications produced comparable results; the male results are somewhat more one-sided
than the female (despite their observed employment gains); and the OLS and LAD results are 
comparable, on average, but may differ considerably on a case by case basis (not shown in
the table).
Table 19: Regression of Change in Domestic Employment/Population on Initial Share Below Minimum:
Summary of Parameter Estimates for Share Below Minimum Under 432 Different Specifications
Estimated under least squares and least absolute deviations; with and without weights; using narrow and broad definitions. Then add controls
for change in mean log wage for non-domestic workers and change in non-domestic employment to population ratio; then add controls for
initial share in compliance with three non-wage provisions (UIF, contract, paid leave) and share offering pension. Significance is defined at the
10% level.
Table 20 summarises the results for the other explanatory variables. For women, the change
in the average wage for non-domestic workers enters negatively and significantly in 46 out of
144 equations, and is positive and significant in just two cases. For men, however, this
variable leans towards the positive. The non-domestic employment control variable’s
estimates are positive and significant in 36 of 144 case for women, with just two significant
negative results. For men, with their smaller sample sizes, these estimates are again less
stable across specifications.
 36 
DPRU Working Paper 05/99 Tom Hertz
Women 
Years Mean estimate 
Mean 
estimate: 
no weights 
Mean 
estimate: 
weights 
Negative 
 & 
significant 
Negative 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
 & 
significant 
District Councils  0àÿà1 0.009 0.014 0.004 1 2 21 0 
 0àÿà2 -0.012 -0.010 -0.014 4 9 11 0 
 1àÿà2 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 9 15 0 0 
Municipalities 0àÿà1 0.013 0.023 0.002 1 4 17 2 
 0àÿà2 -0.017 -0.020 -0.015 7 17 0 0 
 1àÿà2 -0.018 -0.021 -0.016 10 14 0 0 
Magisterial Districts 0àÿà1 0.007 0.010 0.004 0 3 21 0 
 0àÿà2 -0.023 -0.033 -0.013 14 10 0 0 
 1àÿà2 -0.018 -0.029 -0.006 12 8 4 0 
Averages /Totals  0àÿà1 0.010 0.015 0.004 2 9 59 2 
 0àÿà2 -0.017 -0.021 -0.014 25 36 11 0 
 1àÿà2 -0.018 -0.023 -0.013 31 37 4 0 
 All -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 58 82 74 2 
Men 
 
        
District Councils  0àÿà1 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 3 15 6 0 
 0àÿà2 -0.013 -0.015 -0.010 6 12 6 0 
 1àÿà2 -0.021 -0.023 -0.018 12 3 8 1 
Municipalities 0àÿà1 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 6 17 1 0 
 0àÿà2 -0.018 -0.015 -0.021 13 7 4 0 
 1àÿà2 -0.022 -0.021 -0.024 15 9 0 0 
Magisterial Districts 0àÿà1 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 1 18 5 0 
 0àÿà2 -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 1 19 4 0 
 1àÿà2 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 6 14 4 0 
Averages /Totals  0àÿà1 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 10 50 12 0 
 0àÿà2 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 20 38 14 0 
 1àÿà2 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 33 26 12 1 
 All -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 63 114  38 1 
Table 20: Regression of Change in Domestic Employment/Population On Initial Share Below Minimum:
Summary of Results For Other Explanatory Variables Under Different Specifications
See Notes toTable 19
The three non-wage requirement variables (UIF, Contract, Paid Leave), generate more
negative than positive estimates. Recall that a negative effect would be expected if these
variables have an independent positive effect on wages, while a positive coefficient would be
consistent with the proposition that increasing compliance is costly, so that lower rates of
ex-ante compliance (which produce higher increases in compliance) lead to lower rates of
subsequent employment growth. The fact that these figures tend to be negative thus provides 
little evidence for a disemployment effect stemming from the non-wage provisions per se, and 
does lend some support to their use as instruments for the wage change. The possible
exceptions are the generally positive effects of UIF and paid leave for men.
The instrumental variables estimates appear in the final set of tables, 21a for women and 21b
for men. The first column uses the share below the minimum as the sole instrument for the
change in log wages, with no other covariates; the second column adds the labour market
controls; the third adds the four non-wage variables; and the fourth uses the non-wage
variables as additional instruments for the wage, as discussed above. The first three
equations do not tell us anything more than we already knew, although they facilitate the
calculation of the elasticity of the employment-to-population ratio with respect to the average
(not the minimum) wage. We repeat the finding of no significant effect of the minimum wage in 
the Year 0 / Year 1 comparison, and note that adding the new instruments does not alter this
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Women 
Average 
coefficient 
Negative 
 & 
significant 
Negative 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
 & 
significant 
Total  
Change in log non-dom. 
hourly wage -0.016 46 85 11 2 144 
Change in log non-dom. 
emp/pop ratio 0.040 2 36 70 36 144 
Share initially having UIF -0.054 13 50 9 0 72 
Share initially having 
Contract -0.022 24 26 20 2 72 
Share initially having 
Paid Leave -0.018 17 31 20 4 72 
Share initially having 
Pension -0.016 7 31 30 4 72 
 
Men 
      
Change in log non-dom. 
hourly wage 0.004 9 63 50 22 144 
Change in log non-dom. 
emp/pop ratio 0.030 10 37 82 15 144 
Share initially having UIF 0.009 4 22 31 15 72 
Share initially having 
Contract -0.011 15 31 17 9 72 
Share initially having 
Paid Leave 0.005 11 18 26 17 72 
Share initially having 
Pension -0.035 24 29 15 4 72 
conclusion. In the Year 0 / Year 2 columns, where the wage effect is negative and significant,
the addition of the four new instruments appears to reduce the absolute value of the wage
coefficient somewhat (and its corresponding elasticity), as it does in the Year 1 / Year 2
comparisons. Note that Hansen’s test of the validity of the instruments raises no objections in
any of these six specifications, although it did reject some of the models not shown.
Table 21a: Two Stage Least Squares Regressions of Change in Domestic Employment to Population
Ratio Against Change in Mean Log Hourly Wages (Women, Broad Definition, Magisterial Districts, No
Weights)  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; † significant at 5%; ‡ significant at 1%.                                                                     
Wage Instruments: (a) Share below minimum; (b) Share below minimum and the four non-wage variables
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Women 
Change in domestic emp/pop 
Year 0à?1 
Change in domestic emp/pop 
Year 0à?2 
Change in domestic emp/pop 
Year à1?2 
0.016 0.022 0.015 0.017 -0.069† -0.056* -0.077† -0.063* -0.084†  -0.085†  -0.082†  -0.079†  Change in mean log 
wage  (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037) (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Wage instruments a a a b a a a b a a a b 
 -0.030†  -0.027†  -0.029†   -0.021 -0.021 -0.020  0.011 0.011 0.009 Change in log non-
dom. wage (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
0.080 0.072 0.076 0.063 0.065 0.063 0.126† 0.124† 0.126†Change in non-dom. 
emp./pop.  (0.063) (0.058) (0.061) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.055) (0.052)
0.006 0.011 -0.009Share initially having 
UIF   (0.051)    (0.059)    (0.029)  
  -0.096†     -0.063    -0.010  Share initially having 
Contract (0.042) (0.047) (0.019)
0.007 -0.032 0.001Share initially with 
Paid Leave (0.020) (0.033) (0.022)
 -0.001 -0.117 0.048Share initially having 
Pension (0.101) (0.094) (0.043)
-0.011‡ -0.010‡ -0.003‡ -0.009‡ -0.007‡ -0.006‡ 0.010† -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003Intercept 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Test Hansens J=0  
(p-value)    0.16    0.16    0.83 
Mean emp./pop. 0.0899 0.0901 0.0901 0.0901 0.0843 0.0846 0.0846 0.0846 0.0798 0.0798 0.0798 0.0798 
Elasticity of emp./pop. 
to wage 0.17 0.25 0.17 0.18 -0.82 -0.66 -0.92 -0.75 -1.05 -1.06 -1.03 -0.99 
N 304 303 303 303 301 300 300 300 297 297 297 297 
Table 21b: Two Stage Least Squares Regressions of Change in Domestic Employment to Population
Ratio Against Change in Mean Log Hourly Wages (Men, Broad Definition, Magisterial Districts, No
Weights)
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; † significant at 5%; ‡ significant at 1%.                                                                       
Wage Instruments: (a) Share below minimum; (b) Share below minimum and the four non-wage variables.
Elasticities are calculated by dividing the wage coefficient by the mean level of the domestic
worker employment-to-population ratio across regions, reported in the third line from the
bottom.30 These are summarised in Table 22 by averaging across 16 specifications (the four
models from the table above, with and without weights, broad and narrow definitions) for each 
row. For women, the results are positive (but not significantly so) in Year 1, but then became
roughly unit elastic in Year 2; their cumulative employment elasticity with respect to the
average wage, from Year 0 to Year 2 (figures in bold), had an average value of -0.42, and a
median result of -0.46. For men, the results are more consistent across time, but less
consistent across specifications, with an average cumulative effect of -0.48, and a median of
-0.33.
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Men 
Change in domestic emp/pop 
Year 0à?1 
Change in domestic emp/pop 
Year 0à?2 
Change in domestic emp/pop 
Year 1à?2 
-0.007 -0.016 -0.014 -0.013 -0.015 -0.023 -0.024 -0.020 -0.021†  -0.020†  -0.021†  -0.020†  Change in mean log 
wage  (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Wage instruments a a a b a a a b a a a b 
0.039* 0.042* 0.039* 0.030 0.031 0.030 -0.021 -0.023 -0.022Change in log non-
dom. wage (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
 -0.021 -0.018 -0.021  -0.025 -0.030 -0.027  0.064 0.053 0.057 Change in non-dom. 
emp./pop.   (0.091) (0.093) (0.092)  (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)  (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
  -0.008    0.023    -0.018  Share initially having 
UIF (0.040) (0.021) (0.016) 
0.003 -0.020 0.012Share initially having 
Contract   (0.040)    (0.026)    (0.018)  
0.022 0.006 0.003Share initially with 
Paid Leave (0.032) (0.016) (0.017) 
-0.030 -0.053* -0.009Share initially having 
Pension (0.101) (0.032) (0.019) 
0.062‡ 0.060‡ 0.059‡ 0.060‡ 0.051‡ 0.048‡ 0.049‡ 0.047‡ 0.049‡ 0.051‡ 0.051‡ 0.051‡Intercept 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Test Hansens J=0  
(p-value)    0.94    0.50    0.64 
Mean emp./pop. 0.0524 0.0524 0.0527 0.0527 0.0483 0.0483 0.0486 0.0486 0.0491 0.0491 0.0492 0.0492 
Elasticity of emp./pop. 
to wage -0.14 -0.30 -0.26 -0.25 -0.32 -0.47 -0.49 -0.41 -0.43 -0.41 -0.44 -0.42 
N 228 228 226 226 227 227 225 225 223 223 221 221 
30 The predicted change in the employment-to-population ratio given a 1% change in the wage is 0.01 times the
coefficient associated with the difference in log wages.  Divide this by the mean employment ratio and multiply by
100 to express the result as a percentage to yield the elasticity.  For the mean employment ratio I used the
arithmetic mean across regions of the logarithmic mean of the domestic employment-to-population ratios in the
two periods, where the log mean is defined by ( ) ( )e -  e e / e2 1 2 1/ log
Table 22: Estimates of Change in Domestic Employment/Population: Summary of Parameter Estimates
for Share Below Minimum Under 288 Different Specifications
The women’s average elasticity is calculated omitting two outliers with elasticities of +70 and -6. These affect the rows for Years 1→ 2 at the
district council and municipal level only. Significance tests are of the underlying coefficient from the 2SLS regression.
Figure 5 shows a pair of a representative employment equations. The left figure plots the
results of the unweighted OLS regression reported in the last column of Table 18, upper panel 
(slope -0.043), with the 297 magisterial districts as the units of analysis. The right is the
weighted LAD equivalent (slope 0.005; not significant; regression not reported in the table),
with the size of the circles indicating the number of domestic workers in the district. The data
are the residuals after removing the predicted effects of non-domestic wages and
employment, and of the four non-wage variables. The sensitivity of the slope estimates to the
choice of estimator, and the considerable degree of unexplained cross-sectional variation,
are both clear. It was the contemplation of one too many graphs like this that drove me to run
so many different versions of each regression. As it happened, the specification-hunting was
done with only the women’s data at hand, and the resulting package of models was then
applied in its entirety to the male sample.
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Women 
Years  Average
 
Elasticity 
Negative 
& 
significant 
Negative 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
& not 
significant 
Positive 
& 
significant 
District Councils  0àÿà1 0.44 0 1 15 0  0àÿà2 -0.23 2 6 8 0  
1àÿà2
 
-0.98
 
4
 
7
 
4
 
1
 
Municipalities
 
0àÿà1
 
0.31
 
0
 
1
 
13
 
2
 
 
0àÿà2
 
-0.42
 
0
 
16
 
0
 
0
 
 
1àÿà2
 
-1.27
 
4
 
11
 
0
 
1
 
Magisterial Districts
 
0àÿà1
 
0.10
 
0
 
2
 
14
 
0
 
 
0àÿà2
 
-0.62
 
10
 
6
 
0
 
0
 
 
1àÿà2
 
-0.89
 
8
 
8
 
0
 
0
 
Averages /Totals 
 
0àÿà1
 
0.28
 
0
 
4
 
42
 
2
 
 
0àÿà2
 
-0.42
 
12
 
28
 
8
 
0
 
 
1àÿà2
 
-1.04
 
16
 
26
 
4
 
2
 
Median
 
0àÿà2
 
-0.46
     
Men
 
 
      
District Councils 
 
0àÿà1
 
-0.34
 
0
 
13
 
3
 
0
 
 
0àÿà2
 
-0.47
 
1
 
11
 
4
 
0
 
 
1àÿà2
 
-0.54
 
8
 
1
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0
 
Municipalities
 
0àÿà1
 
-0.61
 
5
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2
 
0
 
 
0àÿà2
 
-0.69
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1
 
0
 
 
1àÿà2
 
-0.72
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8
 
0
 
0
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0àÿà1
 
-0.11
 
0
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5
 
0
 
 
0àÿà2
 
-0.27
 
0
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0
 
0
 
 
1àÿà2
 
-0.23
 
4
 
10
 
2
 
0
 
Averages /Totals 
 
0àÿà1
 
-0.35
 
5
 
33
 
10
 
0
 
 
0àÿà2
 
-0.48
 
9
 
34
 
5
 
0
 
 
1àÿà2
 
-0.50
 
20
 
19
 
9
 
0
 
Median
 
0àÿà2
 
-0.33
     
Figure 5: Partial Regression Plot of Unweighted OLS and Weighted LAD Estimates of the Change in
Domestic Employment/Population Ratio (Years 1→ 2) Against Initial Share Below Minimum (Women,
Broad Definition, Magisterial Districts)
The left figure plots the results of the unweighted OLS regression reported in the last column of Table 18, upper panel (slope -0.043), with the
297 magisterial districts as the units of analysis. The right is the weighted LAD equivalent (slope 0.005; not significant; regression not reported
in Table), with the size of the circles indicating the number of domestic workers in the district. The data are the residuals after removing the
predicted effects of nondomestic wages and employment and the four non-wage variables. Six outliers (with y-values below -0.16 or above
0.12) are omitted for clarity, but included in the regressions.
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  5.  Concluding Remarks
Domestic service workers were, and remain, the lowest paid broad category of labour in
South Africa, earning just over half the hourly wage of the next group up, the farmworkers.
Raising their pay, and reforming their relationships with their employers, have long been
goals of the ANC-led government, and the new regulations represent a major step in this
direction. The results just discussed make it plain that, despite substantial apparent
non-compliance with both the wage and non-wage provisions, average hourly wages,
average monthly earnings, and the total monthly earnings of employed domestics are indeed
rising. Progress is also being made in UIF registration (although not, apparently, in the
payment of UIF benefits to unemployed domestic workers, at least, not yet); in the provision
of written contracts; and, to a lesser extent, in the provision of paid leave; and even pensions,
which are not mandated. It also appears that the regulations have reduced the length of the
work week somewhat, without provoking any outcry.
The bad news is that there is also evidence of the microeconomically anticipatable loss in
employment, for both women (whose observed employment levels fell) and for men (whose
employment rose, despite the negative effect of the minimum wage). The mere fact of a
disemployment effect, however, does not condemn the policy. As I argued in an earlier work 
(Hertz 2002), what matters are the relative numbers and sizes of the income gains and
losses, and their location within the broader distribution of household income.31 Are the
disemployed domestics by and large falling below the poverty or ultrapoverty lines?  Are
those who got a raise climbing out of poverty?  In that earlier paper, I tried to answer the
question prospectively, by simulating the distributional impact of the soon-to-be-implemented 
minimum wage, under a series of simplifying assumptions, some of which have since been
shown to be inappropriate, namely, full compliance with the law, no spillover to wages above
the minimum, and no reduction in hours of work for those who remain employed. Using the
1993 PSLSD data, the last national survey for which income-based household poverty
estimates are readily calculated, I lifted all sub-minimum wage domestic workers to the
minimum, and then fired varying numbers of them, with a firing propensity that was higher for
those who had received larger raises. I then recalculated their household incomes, holding all 
other income components constant, and generated new national estimates of poverty,
ultrapoverty, and of mean log household income, a highly progressive income measure.
Last, I plotted the results from many runs (varying the number of people fired and the random
seed that governs the firing process), with the poverty measures on the vertical axis and the
realized elasticity of domestic worker employment to their average wage on the horizontal.
For each poverty or welfare measure this allowed me to locate a critical elasticity, namely, the
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31 A South African friend with deep roots in the anti-apartheid struggle has remarked that empirical cost-benefit
analyses of this kind, no matter how distributionally sensitive, fail to address the profound moral argument for
higher wages and better working conditions, a point which is well taken.  I have focussed on trying to provide
decent empirical information on the question, in hopes that it will inform the policy debate, of which the moral
arguments are likewise an important part.
elasticity which generated no change in the outcome. I found that any elasticity less than
about one in absolute value was low enough to allow the poverty and ultrapoverty rates to
improve, despite the loss of jobs. At higher elasticities, the job losses outweighed the income
gains, and poverty or ultrapoverty rose.32 For gains in mean log welfare, the elasticity must
smaller (less negative) than about -0.60.
With a moderate leap of faith, across ten years and all the limitations of both the simulation
method and the econometrics just witnessed, we may compare these critical values to the
averages and medians of our estimated cumulative two-year employment elasticities in Table 
22. These range between -0.33 and -0.48, and would thus appear to be low enough for the
policy to have been poverty-and ultrapoverty-alleviating, by a fairly comfortable margin.33 As
for mean log welfare, whose critical value is -0.60, the figures appear to fall below this line as
well, but the margin is much smaller. The point estimates suggest that, by this progressive
welfare measure, the minimum wage has been beneficial, but the confidence interval likely
includes negative outcomes.
If we also take into account the reduction in hours worked, the relevant elasticities are higher.
Using the results from Tables 13 and 16, we may derive an estimated elasticity of hours per
week to the real wage of -0.47 for women and -0.28 for men.34 Adding these elasticities to the
(average) employment elastiticies yields a wage elasticity of total hours of -0.99 for women
and -0.76 for men. These figures imply that the minimum wage has left the total real monthly
earnings of employed women unchanged, but raised the total earnings for men. Comparing
these figures to the critical values described above, we can conclude that, for women, neither  
poverty nor ultrapoverty have changed by very much as a result of the minimum wage, while
for men they should have improved somewhat.
Once we take account of hours of work, both the male and female figures are higher than the
critical value for mean log welfare (-0.60), suggesting that the negative welfare effects of the
job losses may have outweighed the welfare gains associated with rising monthly earnings.
However, it could also be argued that the poverty and welfare calculations should not make
any adjustment for the reduction in the length of the work week, since this is immaterial to
those who lost their jobs, and, according to the evidence in Table 4, unobjectionable to those
who are still employed. If this latter argument is accepted, we may again conclude that the
minimum wage policy has been beneficial, but must admit that this conclusion is tentative,
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32 I can think of no good reason that unity should be the critical value: that fact is a finding of the quasi-experimental
approach, based on the data at hand, not a theoretical given.
33 I have not yet been able to provide standard errors for these aggregate estimates, as each is an average over a
dozen models whose outputs cannot be treated as independent.
34 I take the average effect of the share below the minimum on hours per week, across all specifications that
compare Year 0 to Year 2, expressed as a percentage change in hours, and divide this by the average percentage
effect on the wage (at the district council level, to avoid the upward bias at finer levels of disaggregation).  For
women the figures are (-6.89 / 41.5) / 0.356 = -0.47.  For men: (-8.62 / 39.6) / 0.771 = -0.28.
given that the critical elasticity values were derived from outdated survey data, and that the
simulations do not exactly mimic the patterns of change in wages and employment that we
have witnessed since the minimum was introduced.35 
Finally, I should again remind the reader of the sensitivity of the descriptive results, and, to a
lesser extent, the econometrics, to the choice of weights. I have calibrated the weights as
best I can, but Statistics South Africa’s revision may produce a better final product, and this
could alter my findings.
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35 It should also be noted that the elasticity for women appears to be getting more negative as time goes by.  The two
year average was -0.42, but in the second year the figure was -1.04.  (This is the opposite of what we found using
the crude elasticities in Table 6, where the more recent figures were the smaller ones.)  If this is a sign of things to
come, it would mean larger employment losses as the minimum is raised and enforcement is stepped up.  But it is
even harder to predict future elasticities than to estimate past ones.
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Appendix  1: Reproduction of Tables 1 and 2 from Sectoral Determination
(Department of Labour 2002a)
Table 1: Minimum wages for domestic workers who work more than 27 ordinary hours per week *
Table 2: Minimum wages for part time domestic workers who work 27 ordinary hours per week or less*
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        AREA A 
Bergrivier Local Municipality, Breederivier Local Municipality, Buffalo City Local Municipality, Cape Agulhas Local Municipality, Cederberg Local  Municipality, City of Cape Town, 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, Drakenstein Local Municipality, Ekurhulen Metropolitan Municipality, Emalahleni Local 
Municipality, Emfuleni Local Municipality, Et hekwini Metropolitan Unicity, Gamagara Local Municipality, George Local Municipality, Hibiscus Coast Local Municipality, Karoo 
Hoogland Local Municipality, Kgatelopele Local Municipality, Khara Hais Local Municipality, Knysna Local Municipality, Kungwini L ocal Municipality, Kouga Local Municipality, 
Langeberg Local Municipality, Lesedi Local Municipality,  Makana Local Municipality, Mangaung Local Municipality, Matzikama Local Municipality, Metsimaholo Local Municipality, 
Middelburg Local Municipality, Midv aal Local Municipality, Mngeni Local Municipality, Mogale Local Municipality, Mosselbaai Local Municipality, Msunduzi Local Municipality, 
Mtubatu Local Municipality, Nama Khoi Local Municipality, Nelson Mandela, Nokeng tsa Taemane Local Municipality, Oudts hoorn Local Municipality, Overstrand Local 
Municipality, Plettenbergbaai Local Municipality, Potchefstroom Local Municipality, Randfontein Local Municipality, Richtersveld Local Municipality, Saldanha Bay Local 
Municipality, Sol Plaatjie Local Municipality , Stellenbosch Local Municipality, Swartland Local Municipality, Swellendam Local Municipality, Theewaterskloof Local Municipality, 
Umdoni Local Municipality, uMhlathuze Local Municipality and Witzenberg Local Municipality.  
 
 
Minimum rates for the period         
1 November 2002 to 31 October 2003 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2003 to 31 October 2004 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2004 to 31 October 2005 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
4,10 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
4,42 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
4,77 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
184,62 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
198,90 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
214,65 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
800,00 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
861,90 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
930,15 
AREA B 
 
AREAS NOT MENTIONED IN AREA A  
 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2002 to 31 October 2003 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2003 to 31 October 2004 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2004 to 31 October 2005 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
3,33 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
3,59 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
3,87 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
150,00 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
161,55 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
174,15 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
650,00 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
700,05 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
754,65 
 
        AREA A 
Bergrivier Local Municipality, Breederivier Local Municipality, Buffalo City Local Municipality, Cape Agulhas Local Municipality, Cederberg Local Municipality, City of Cape Town, 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, City of Tshwane  Metropolitan Municipality, Drakenstein Local Municipality, Ekurhulen Metropolitan Municipality, Emalahleni Local 
Municipality, Emfuleni Local Municipality, Ethekwini Metropolitan Unicity, Gamagara Local Municipality, George Local Municipality, Hibiscus Co ast Local Municipality, Karoo 
Hoogland Local Municipality, Kgatelopele Local Municipality, Khara Hais Local Municipality, Knysna Local Municipality, Kungwini Local Municipality, Kouga Local Municipality, 
Langeberg Local Municipality, Lesedi Local Municipal ity,  Makana Local Municipality, Mangaung Local Municipality, Matzikama Local Municipality, Metsimaholo Local Municipality, 
Middelburg Local Municipality, Midvaal Local Municipality, Mngeni Local Municipality, Mogale Local Municipality, Mosselbaai Local Mu nicipality, Msunduzi Local Municipality, 
Mtubatu Local Municipality, Nama Khoi Local Municipality, Nelson Mandela, Nokeng tsa Taemane Local Municipality, Oudtshoorn Local Municipality, Overstrand Local 
Municipality, Plettenbergbaai Local Municipality, Potc hefstroom Local Municipality, Randfontein Local Municipality, Richtersveld Local Municipality, Saldanha Bay Local 
Municipality, Sol Plaatjie Local Municipality, Stellenbosch Local Municipality, Swartland Local Municipality, Swellendam Local Municipality, T heewaterskloof Local Municipality, 
Umdoni Local Municipality, uMhlathuze Local Municipality and Witzenberg Local Municipality.  
 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2002 to 31 October 2003 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2003 to 31 October 2004 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2004 to 31 October 2005 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
4,51 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
4,87 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
5,25 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
212,77 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
131,49 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
141,75 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
527,67 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
569,79 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
614,25 
AREA B 
 
AREAS NOT MENTIONED IN AREA A  
 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2002 to 31 October 2003 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2003 to 31 October 2004 
Minimum rates for the period          
1 November 2004 to 31 October 2005 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
3,66 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
3,95 
Hourly rate 
(R) 
 
4,26 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
98,82 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
106,65 
Weekly rate 
(R) 
 
115,02 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
428,22 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
462,15 
Monthly rate 
(R) 
 
498,42 
